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The Jurisprudence of Interests as a
Method of Constitutional Adjudication
Chester James Antieau*
The broad guarantees of the Constitution were, intended to accomodate evolving societal interest'. To the Supreme Court, as the final interpreter of the Constitution, falls the task of defining those interests of the society which deserve constitutionalprotectian and deternining which interest will prevail when two or more
interests clash. Professor Antieau, focusing his attention on confliQts between first
amendment freedoms and othersocietal interests, investigates the potential utility of
a jurisprudence of interests, a system of constitutional adjudication in which opposed societal interests are openly evaluated and balanced. The author concludes
that proper application of this mnethod of adjudication and a clear articulation of
the factors entering into the balancing process will produce the greatest return in
terns of group and individual justice.
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The Jurisprudence of Interests as a
Method of Constitutional Adjudication
I. INTRODUCTION
ONTEMPORARY

CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES

cannot adequately

be resolved by the United States Supreme Court or other tribunals

when the broad concepts, such as due process, equal protection, freedom of
speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom from an establishment of religion, the commerce clauses, the contract clause, the cruel and
unusual punishment ban, and the privileges and immunities clauses are to
be construed solely, or even primarily, by searching for "the intent of the
framers" or by adherence to the precedents of past generations-judicial,
legislative, or executive. The conflicts of our contemporary society can be
more readily resolved through a more intensive application and refinement
of the methodologies of interessenjurisprudenz-ajurisprudence of interests.
Under this Inethod of dispute resolution, the constitutional tribunal identifies the opposed societal interests, reconciles them if possible, and, if reconciliation is not possible, rules that one societal interest under the circumstances must prevail over another, with an explanation to the community of why this is so.
Interesseijurisprudenzowes its origin to the German jurist, Rudolf von
Jhering. 1 In this country the earliest endorsement of this form of jurisprudence came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin
Cardozo who readily saw the advantages of a sociological jurisprudence. As
early as 1881 Holmes asserted that the task of judging demands an awareness of societal interests. He wrote:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention ...are
the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I
mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the coinmunity concerned. Every important principle which is developed
by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be
sure, under our practices and traditions, the unconscious result of

* B.S. (1934), M.S. (1935), Detroit Institute of Technology; J.D. (1941), Detroit College;

LL.M. (1951), S.J.D. (1952), University of Michigan, LL.D. (1977), Georgetown University.
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to the Michigan, Kansas, and District of Columbia Bars.
1. R. VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1904) (LAw AS MEANS TO AN END) (I. Husik
transl. 1913).
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instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none
the
2
less traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.
Holmes was well aware that successful constitutional adjudication demands a judicial awareness of clashing societal interests and a skillful reconciliation or resolution of such interests. He observed:
I think it most important to remember whenever a doubtful case
arises, with certain analogies on one side and other analogies on
the other, that what really is before us is a conflict between two
social desires, each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the
case, and which cannot both have their way. The social question is
which desire is stronger at the point of conflict. 3
In 1897 Holmes urged that judges openly explore the impact of their constitutional rulings upon their society:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.
The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the
very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often
unconscious .... 4
More than most of his contemporaries in 1908, Holmes knew of "the limits
set to property by other public interests," 5 blanketed customarily in American public law under the compendious term, "the police power." He sagely
observed that "It]he boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance." 6 This remark
applies not only to litigation involving a property interest, but to all cases in
which societal interests clash.
By 1911 Roscoe Pound had endorsed a sociological jurisprudence and
enthusiastically approved of von Jhering's interessenjurisprudenz.7 He
knew that broad constitutional concepts, such as due process of law, require
a constant weighing, balancing, and adjusting of opposed societal interests.
The very term, "due process of law," he explained in 1943, implies "a
weighing or balancing of the various interests which overlap or come in conflict and a rational reconciling or adjustment."R
2. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 35-36 (1881).
3. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1920).
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAr/v. L. REv. 456, 467 (1897).
5. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).

6. Id.
7. Pound, The Scope and Purposes of SociologicalJurisprudence, 24 HARv. L. REv. 591,
25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 25 HArrv. L. REv. 489 (1911).
8. Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1943).
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Benjamin Cardozo, later to become a distinguished Justice of the Supreme Court, recognized that constitutional adjudication requires an identification and balancing of opposed societal interests. As he summarized in
1921:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little
more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted
standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces shall
dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the comparative
importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby
promoted or impaired. 9
To Cardozo, the balancing of societal interests was the very essence of the
function of the judge.
In problems such as these, the need is fairly obvious for a balancing of social interests and a choice proportioned to the value ....
Involved at every turn is the' equilibration of social interests ....
Back of the answers is a measurement of interests, a balancing of
values, an appeal to the experience and sentiments and moral and
Constant and inevitaeconomic judgments of the community ....
ble, even when half concealed, is the relation between the legality
of the act and its value to society. We are balancing and compromising and adjusting every moment that we judge.' 0
United States Supreme Court Justices who have succeeded Justices
Holmes and Cardozo, have with rare exceptions, acknowledged the legitimacy of applying the methodologies of a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional construction. In 1957, for example, Justice Harlan spoke of the
frequent instances where the Court is "called upon to balance the interest in
free expression against other interests." 1 ' Speaking for the Court in 1961,
he appreciated that restraints upon the first amendment values have been
upheld
when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has
necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest inWhenever, in such a context, these constitutional provolved ....

9. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1912).

10. B. CARDOzO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 72-75 (1928).
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (dissenting).
For an interesting analysis of the balancing undertaken by Justices Harlan and Powell, see
Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24
STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1972).
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tections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental
powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests in2
volved.'
Six years later, Justice Harlan reaffirmed his position: "I agree, of course,
with this 'balancing' approach. Indeed, I cannot conceive of any other sound
method of attacking this type of problem."13
Although he would have preferred the weighing and balancing of societal
interests to be done whenever possible by the legislatures, Justice Frankfurter knew that in our society the Supreme Court would ultimately have to
take this responsibility. "The Due Process Clause," he wrote, "places upon
this Court the duty of exercising a judgment . . .upon interests of society
pushing in opposite directions."' 4 He added:
In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on
a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims ... on a judgment not ad hoc and
episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of con15
tinuity and of change in a progressive society.
In 1951 Justice Frankfurter expanded this discussion in the area of first
amendment rights: "The demands of free speech in a democratic society as
well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and
informed weighing of the competing interests within the confines of the
judicial process." 16 "[J]udges .. . I" he wrote, "have to adjudicate. If the
conflict cannot be resolved, the task of the Court is to arrive at an accommodation of the contending claims. This is the core of the difficulties and
misunderstandings about the judicial process. This, for any conscientious
judge, is the agony of his duty." 17
12. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
13. UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.. 217, 227 (1967) (dissenting). But compare his
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 206-07
(1970).
See Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 845, 478 P.2d
792, 799 (1970): "The balancing of conflicting interests is basic to the achievement of justice as
the goal of law."
14. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
15. Id. at 172.
16. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (concurring); accord, Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961). See Harlan, -The Frankfurter
Imprint As Seen By A Colleague, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1962).
17. Frankfurter, The Job of a Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1954, § 6
(Magazine), at 14.

JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS

Similarly Justice Owen Roberts in 1940 saw the propriety of applying the
methods of interessenjurisprudenzin constitutional adjudication and applied
this method to recognize the strong societal interest in communication. He
wrote for the Court, reviewing the validity of a conviction of an evangelist
under a breach of the peace statute:
Decision as to the lawfulness of the conviction demands the weighing of two conflicting interests. The fundamental law declares the
interest of the United States that the free exercise of religion be
not prohibited and that freedom to communicate information and
opinion be not abridged. The State .. .has an obvious interest in
the preservation and protection of peace and good order within her
borders. We must determine whether the alleged protection of the
State's interest . . . has been pressed, in this instance, to a point
where it has come into fatal collision with the overriding interest
protected by the federal compact.1 8
Five years later, his colleague, Justice Wiley Rutledge indicated that he
agreed with the need to identify and balance societal interests in constitutional adjudication:
Where the line shall'be placed in a particular application rests ...
on the concrete clash of particular interests and the community's
relative evaluation of both of them and how the one will be affected by the specific restriction, the other by its absence. That
judgment in the first instance is for the legislative body. But in our
system where the line can constitutionally be placed presents a
question this Court cannot escape answering independently, whatever the legislative judgment, in the light of our constitutional
tradition. 19
Justice William 0. Douglas knew of the need for a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional adjudication, even when first amendment interests
were involved. In 1948 he spoke for the Supreme Court in a case evaluating
the constitutionality of a sound truck ordinance: "Courts must balance the
various community interests in passing on the constitutionality of local regulations of the character involved here." 20 Two years later, Chief Justice
Vinson's opinion for the Court mirrored this view:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
18.
19.
20.
quoted
of first

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945).
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948). However, despite the breadth of the
statement, Justice Douglas continues in this opinion to emphasize the preferred position
amendment rights.
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abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which
of these two conflicting interests demands the2 1 greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented.
The extent to which the jurisprudence of interests has been assimilated
into the adjudication of complex constitutional issues is evidenced by the fact
that Chief Justice Vinson's predecessor and his two successors as Chief Justice have all accepted its validity.2 2 "The balancing test used by the
Court," said Chief Justice Burger in 1976, "requires that fair recognition be
23
given to competing interests."
A number of distinguished modern Justices have acknowledged that
there must be a weighing and balancing of social interests in the resolution
of complex issues of constitutional law.2 4 Representative of this view is Jus21. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
22. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945) (Stone, C.J.); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Warren, C.J.).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 238 (1976).
24. Justices Fortas, Goldberg, and Reed approved this method even where first amendment
values were involved. Dissenting in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), Justice Fortas
stated that communicative action "may be subjected to reasonable regulation that appropriately
takes into account the competing interests involved." Id. at 616. In his opinion in a courthouse
picketing dispute, Justice Goldberg emphasized that the Court must "vindicate the State's interest in assuring justice under law," even if the interest in communication is thereby affected.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965); accord, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336
(1946) (Reed, J.).
Justice Brennan accepted the propriety of a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional
adjudication and has attested to this on many occasions. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
237-41 (1972) (concurring); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262-66 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-44 (1963); cf. Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 76, 86 (1966) (recognizing the tension between first and fourteenth amendment values and society's interest in preventing defamation).
Justice Marshall, as well, employed this method in identifying opposed societal interests
and balancing them both in first amendment litigation and elsewhere. E.g., California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 138-39 (1972) (dissenting) (freedom of expression); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330. 337 (1972) (franchise right); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 86 (1971)
(dissenting) (freedom of speech); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971) (freedom
of religion); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1970) (franchise right).
So, too, Justice Stewart has been willing to participate in adjusting and balancing societal
interests. E.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 632 (1972) (dissenting in part); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 237-41 (1972) (opinion by White, J., with wh6m Brennan & Stewart,
JJ., join, concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (opinion by
Marshall, J. with whom Stewart, J., joins, dissenting); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960), although of late he has expressed his fears that the process may unwisely dilute the first
amendment values. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human relations, 413 U.S.
376, 403 (1973) (dissenting) ("Those who think the First Amendment can and should be subordinated to other socially desirable interests will hail today's decision. But I find it freightening.").
Justice White has supported the necessity of a balancing approach, writing that some cases
"inevitably call for a delicate balancing of important but conflicting interests." Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 237 (1972). Apparently Justice Rehnquist is willing to accept the balancing
role of the Court-so much so, in fact, that he describes it as the "typical" method of resolving
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tice Powell's acceptance of the propriety of a jurisprudence of interests in
25
Branzburg v. Hayes:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.2 6
Clear statements of the views of the constitutional generation are, of
course, relevant in contemporary construction, but only to the extent that
they represent enduring values or interests of our society that are of a dignity deserving constitutional protection. 27 The Supreme Court Justices and
constitutional scholars have often concluded that the search for the intent of
the framers is fruitless. 28 Even when some expressions of the framers' in-

first amendment disputes. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 789-90 (1976) (dissenting) (quoting American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950)).
Joining Justices of the Supreme Court in an endorsement of the methodologies of a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional adjudication have been a number of notable legal scholars: A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 78 (1970); F. CASTBERG,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE VEST 429 (1960); Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 35 (1941); M. RAMASWAMY, THE CREATIVE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (1956); Heck; The Jurisprudence of Interests, An Outline, 2 THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 40 (M. Schoch ed. 1948); Cohn, Book Review, 13 MOD. L. REv.
117, 119 (1950) (THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS (1948)); Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH.
L. REv. 619, 626 (1960) (A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960)).
25. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (concurring).
26. Id. at 710. But note his 1974 opinion for the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 343, 347 (1974), where he accepted the need for the Court to balance society's
interest in communication against its interest in protecting private reputation. He added that
"'an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible,"
and indicated his preference for a general rule allowing private citizens defamed by the media
to collect compensatory damages under state law "so long as that law did not impose liability
without fault."
27. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 495 (1977), wherein Justice Brennan states:
[T]he genius of our Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had in a
world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope
with problems of a developing America. A principle to be vital must be of wider
application than the mischief that gave it birth.
28. Speaking for the Court in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
Chief Justice Hughes admitted: "In the construction of the contract clause, the debates in the
Constitutional Convention are of little aid." Id. at 427. More recently, Justice White, writing
for the Court regarding the article III jury clause, found the traditional sources to be less than
useful in establishing the intent of the Constitution's drafters: "The 'very scanty history ... in
the records of the Constitutional Convention' sheds little light either way on the intended
correlation between Article III's 'jury' and the features of the jury at common law." Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93 (1970) (quoting Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
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tent are available, they may only represent the values of the past which later
29
generations have deliberately chosen to repudiate.
Nevertheless, to apply a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional adjudication is not to manifest disrespect for the generation that gave us the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. When the "Founding Fathers" dedicated
our nation to the protection of the basic dignity of man, to the principles of
a free society where individuals would have generous opportunity for developing their talents, and to the creation of a society where an open marketplace of ideas would prevail, they forcefully indicated the values and interests they hoped would continue to be shared by subsequent generations
in this land. In general, these interests have been shared and appreciated
not only by the society but by the courts charged with constitutional construction. Justice Frankfurter has reminded us, moreover, that the values to
be weighed by.a court applying the methods of a jurisprudence of interests
are those "deemed representative of the community as a continuing society." 30 It can safely be asserted that the constitutional generation believed
with Holmes that "[t]he present has a right to govern itself," 31 and that later
generations could permissibly infuse their newly discovered values and interests into the broad phrases of the Constitution. 32 This attitude was expressed as early as 1816 by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to a friend:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and
deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.
They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than
human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I
knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country.... [L]aws and institutions must go
hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also,
33
and keep pace with the times.
the ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAInv. L. REv. 917, 922 n.14 (1926)). See also
the opinion by Justice Harlan in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970); Grant, The
Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 56, 66 (1931)..
29. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
30. Frankfurter, The Job of a Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1954, § 6
(Magazine), at 14.
31. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139 (1920).
32. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966):
[Tihe Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular
era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due
process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights.
33. Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 11-12 (Ford ed.

1905).
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Precedents and practices of earlier generations take on meaning only
when and if they represent the continuing values of our society. Insofar as
they represent repudiated values, as they frequently do, 34 such precedents
can be disavowed in contemporary constitutional construction. Justice Harlan maintained: "It is, of course, true that history should not imprison those
broad guarantees of the Constitution whose proper scope is to be determined in a given instance by a blend of historical understanding and the
adaptation of purpose to contemporary circumstances." 35 On another occasion he added that the Court, in construing the broad concepts in the Constitution, is permitted to do so "in light of evolving needs and circumstances." 36 Justice Frankfurter likewise looked backwards at times to
the value structures of such generations as those responsible for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, inter alia, to
ascertain the lasting values and interests of our "community as a continuing
society." But perhaps the most radical view was espoused by Justice Holmes
who wrote that he looked forward "to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be
attained and the reasons for desiring them." 37
The jurisprudence of interests does not accept the absolute nature of
either individual rights or societal interests. Even the societal interest in
communication may be outweighed at times by other more important interests of society; this the Supreme Court accepts, as evidenced by Chief
Justice Vinson's statement for the Court in 1951: "[T]he societal value of
speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations."
A quarter century later the Court confirmed its stance: "We have
acknowledged that there are governmental interests sufficiently important to
outweigh the possibility of infringement, particularly when the 'free functioning of our national institutions' is involved." 3 9
II.

CRITICISMS OF A JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS

Certain criticisms of the methods implicit in a jurisprudence of interests
in constitutional adjudication have surfaced that merit identification and
34. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949) (with list of Supreme Court cases
overruled, id. at 756-68).
35. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 124-25 (1970) (dissenting); accord, Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910): A phrase like cruel and unusual punishment "is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice.").
36. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 346 (1970) (concurring).
37. 0. HOLMES, supra note 31, at 195.
38. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
39. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961)).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:823

evaluation. Some critics have attacked the very basis of this approach to
constitutional adjudication, questioning whether it is even possible to measure fundamental values or interests. Other commentators have suggested
that judges typically have neither the means nor the competence to weigh
and adjust such societal interests. Allowing the judiciary to identify and balance fundamental social interests, it is feared, may permit judges to impose
their own values upon the society. Thus it has been urged that this task is
properly reserved solely for legislative bodies. Some jurists have said that
when the constitutional generation ratified the Bill of Rights it did all the
balancing that was necessary, reflecting the fear that any further balancing
by the judiciary will fail to respect adequately the societal interests in the
freedoms contained within those amendments. Lastly, because the jurisprudence of interests is acknowledged to be sociological and utilitarian, some
philosophers have felt the judiciary is incompetent to .forecast the utility of a
proposed rule or its impact.:upon the society.
Among those jurists who were reluctant to accept a jurisprudence of interests because they believed values or interests are not measurable was
Judge Learned Hand. Such a method, he wrote, would "demand the appraisal and balancing of human values which there are no scales -to weigh."
"The difficulty here," he added, "does not-come from ignorance, but from
the absence of any standards, for values are incommensurable." 40 Some
other constitutional scholars have agreed with Judge Hand's analysis, pointing out that without a "basis of absolutes" societal interests evade a rational
balancing process. 41 Questioning whether human values are commensurable, Morris Cohen remarked:
For years I have followed with close interest and great hope the
movement of Interessenjurisprudenz in France, Germany, and in
this country, and I regret not to be able to see as yet any substantial progress toward the solution of the problem of determining
with some degree of definiteness the relative weights which different social interests should have in the legal system.
Yet he realistically concluded: "Still the effort at some kind of systematic
evaluation of these interests is inescapable. The possibility of intelligent
choice depends on it." 42 Even Justice Harlan expressed a fear that some
interests are "incommensurate," at least by the Supreme Court, 43 and yet
he was generally more willing to accept the methods of a jurisprudence of
interests than any of his colleagues.
40. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 161 (1952).

41. G.

PATON, JURISPRUDENCE

127 (4th ed. 1972).

42. M. COHEN, REASON AND LAW 8, 97 (1950).
43. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 206 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In response, it must be emphasized that values and interests are not only
identifiable but are also measurable by organs of the state. Legislatures daily
weigh and balance societal interests in drafting legislation. If anything, the
task should be easier for constitutional courts which we have endeavored to
immunize from the passions and prejudices of the moment. Furthermore,
courts have measured and balanced societal interests for centuries in the
common law world with a great measure of social acceptance. Sir Richard
O'Sullivan has aptly testified that "[iun the measurement of these interests
. .the Common Law habitually uses a certain scale of objective values, the
lesser of which it is ready to subordinate, and on occasion even sacrifice, to
those of a higher rank." 44 Certainly, the judicial organs of a society that has
a written constitution in which the larger values are identified should be
able to determine and measure some values of the group.
Jurisprudence of interests has been criticized on the basis that the
judiciary has neither the means nor the competence to weigh and adjust the
important interests of society. Even Justice Harlan expressed reservations
about the competence of the courts to weigh particular values in clashing
situations when he wrote that "judgments of the sort involved here [determining whether Congress could permit eighteen-year-olds to vote] are
beyond the institutional competence and constitutional authority of the
judiciary.... They are pre-eminently matters for legislative discretion, with
judicial review, if it exists at all, narrowly limited."4 5 His colleagues disagreed, however, and proceeded to balance the opposed interests in a way
46
generally acceptable to the community.
Professor Paton has suggested that the only way the judiciary can determine that one interest outweighs another is by recourse to public opinion,4 7
but he is in error. Some understanding of the preferences of the society can
be obtained by mere reference to the organic law.48 The ways in which
legislative bodies in the society have adjusted competing interests tend to
manifest society's relative evaluation of those opposed interests. In addition,
judicial precedents very often divulge the Court's conclusions as to how the
clashing interests should be evaluated. There are other sources open to any
*

44. O'Sullivan, A Scale of Values in the Common Law, 1 MOD. L. REv. 27, 38 (1937).
45. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 206-07 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
46. As previously indicated, however, Justice Harlan was generally and overwhelmingly
committed to the judiciary's use of the methods of a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional
adjudication. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
47. "A survey of the actual interests demanded by society provides no basis for preferring
one to another save that provided by the strength of popular opinion." G. PATON, supra note
41, at 127.
48. First amendment values "hold a preferred position in the hierarchy of the constitutional
guarantees of the incidents of freedom." Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953).
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court concerned with constitutional adjudication, as later parts of this article
explore.
Some jurists have suggested that the weighing of conflicting societal interests is almost exclusively a task for legislative bodies. Justice Frankfurter,
for one, believed that the society's elected representatives were more competent to strike the balance between these interests than were courts.
Free speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are
not legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How
best to reconcile competing interests is the business of legislatures
and the balance they strike is a judgment not to be displaced by
ours, 49
but to be respected unless outside the pale of fair judg-

ment .

Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter participated willingly in judicial weighing
of opposed interests on many occasions. Voicing his opposition to absolute
rules in 1951, he wrote: "The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid
and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the
judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the nonEuclidean problems to be solved." 50 There was a comparable inclination on
the part of Justice Harlan to leave the weighing of interests to the legisla51
tures.
Notwithstanding the respect due these two Justices, it must be recognized that in our constitutional society, committed to judicial review, the
task of identifying and balancing the competing interests must ultimately be
performed by the Supreme Court-not by Congress or any other legislature.
It must be appreciated that in many situations requiring constitutional adjudication by that Court, there has been no previous balancing by any legislative body. This is so, for instance, when some public servant without any
legislative authority arbitrarily suppresses the communicative process. 52 It
is equally true in a host of cases where a misguided trial court issues orders
in accordance with what it considers a proper weighing of the relevant
societal interests. 53 And, it is so where citizens are prosecuted under com54
mon law crimes.

49. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (concurring). See also J. LASH,
FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 85-86 (1974).

50. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951).
51. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See text accompanying note 13 supra.
52. E.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
53. E.g., Carroll v. Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
54. E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
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Even where there have been previous judgments by local legislators,
they may have to be set aside by the Supreme Court because parochial
55
concerns were overemphasized at the expense of the national interest.
Furthermore, even when Congress attempts to balance competing interests,
it may lose sight of the lasting values of our continuing society or give insufficient weight to the legitimate concerns of the states in our federal system
so that intervention by the high court is mandated.5 6
A fourth criticism of a jurisprudence of interests has been leveled by
Chief Justice Warren, as well as Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart. Each
has, on occasion, asserted that all the necessary balancing in first amendment cases was done by the generation that ratified the Bill of Rights and
that permitting a contemporary Supreme Court to balance the interests
would too often subordinate the societal interest in communication to other
interests. As Justice Black stated: "The men who drafted our Bill of Rights
did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field." 57 Justice Douglas
often agreed. 58 Chief Justice Warren, with Justices Black and Douglas, dissented in 1959 from the majority's decision to balance a "governmental" interest in security against an "individual" interest of a teacher who was unwilling to talk about his allegedly subversive associations. They protested:
To apply the Court's balancing teit under such circumstances is to
read the First Amendment to say "Congress shall pass no law
abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless
Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that
on balance the interest of the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of the people in having them
exercised." 59
Admittedly, the majority's balancing of "governmental" versus "individual"
interests rather than opposed societal interests was a gross perversion of the
55. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
56. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946).
57. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (dissenting). "I do not believe that any
federal agencies, including Congress and this Court, have power or authority to subordinate
speech and press to what they think are 'more important interests.' The contrary notion is, in
my judgment, court-made not Constitution-made." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 158-59
(1959) (concurring). See also California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (dissenting); El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (dissenting).
58. Why does "the freedom of speech" that the Court is willing to protect turn out to
be so pale and tame?
It is because ... the Bill of Rights is constantly watered down through judicial "balancing" of what the Constitution says and what judges think is needed for
a well-ordered society.
Carrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 81-82 (1964) (concurring). See also United States v.
Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (dissenting); Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (concurring).
59. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959) (dissenting).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:823

jurisprudence of interests, 60 but the dissent seemed to say that any balancing was uncalled for.
Justice Potter Stewart joined Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Douglas in 1973 when, in dissent in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Human
Relations Commission,6 ' he wrote:
So long as Members of this Court view the First Amendment as no
more than a set of "values" to be balanced against other "values,"
that Amendment will remain in grave jeopardy ....
Those who
think the First Amendment can and should be subordinated to
other socially desirable
interests will hail today's decision. But I
62
find it frightening.
One is entitled to be frightened at some of the first amendment decisions of
the Supreme Court, but most of these were reached without even the recognition of the methods of a jurisprudence of interests. Moreover, especially
in five-to-four decisions, it can be expected that the American community
will not always be satisfied with results reached under a conscious weighing
and balancing by the courts.6 3
Notwithstanding the foregoing utterances of these respected Justices, it
should be noted that they, like their colleagues, have frequently balanced
opposed societal interests in constitutional litigation involving first amendment values. In 1948, Justice Douglas firmly maintained that "courts must
balance the various community interests in passing on the constitutionality of
local regulations" affecting communication.6 In United States v. O'Brien 6
and Kramer v. Union Free School District,66 Chief Justice Warren was quite
willing to utilize the methods of interessenjurisprudenzto resolve constitutional issues. Even Justice Black wrote in Martin v. Struthers,6 7 a first
amendment case, that the Court is "faced . . . with the necessity of weighing the conflicting interests." 68 Three years later he confirmed this approach, acknowledging that "we balance the constitutional rights of owners
of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion." 69
60. For a discussion of the proper interests to be balanced, see text accompanying notes
79-95 infra.
61. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
62. Id. at 402-03.
63. See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
64. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).
65. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

66. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
67. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
68. Id. at 143.

69. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); accord, Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Justice Stewart, too, has been willing-and quite properly-to participate in
arriving at constitutional decisions even in first amendment controversies by
consciously weighing and balancing societal interests.7 0 There is simply no
other way of satisfactorily adjudicating the clash of values which are not absolutes.
Another criticism of the jurisprudence of interests arises from the fear
that this method of analysis will lead the Supreme Court Justices to impose
their own value structures upon the society. "Where the balance is to be
struck," said Justice Harlan, "depends ultimately on the- values and the
perspective of the decisionmaker." 71 This remark, although not representative of the views of Justice Harlan, illustrates the community's common perception of judicial balancing.
Judicial decisionmaking, utilizing the methodologies of a jurisprudence of
interests, does not depend upon the personal values or predilections of the
judge as has been thoroughly understood by capable Justices such as Cardozo and Frankfurter. Judges, said Justice Cardozo, are not free "to substitute their own ideas of reason and justice for those of the men and women
whom they serve. Their standard must be an objective one." 72 Justice
Frankfurter was in complete accord. Speaking of due process of law, he said:
We cannot escape acknowledging that it involves the application of
standards of fairness and justice very broadly conceived. They are
not the application of merely personal standards but the impersonal standards of society which alone Judges, as the organs of
Law, are empowered to enforce. [Judges must apply] that consenof due process, is
sus of society's opinion which, for the purposes
73
the standard enjoined by the Constitution.
In Solesbee v. Balkcom, 74 he further described the process of constitutional
adjudication in the area of due process: "In applying such a large untechnical
concept as 'due process,' the Court enforces those permanent and pervasive
feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind
relevant to judgments on social institutions." 7 5 "It is the essence of judicial
duty to subordinate our own personal views," echoed Justice Stewart, dis-

70. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (dissenting in part); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (dissenting); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
71. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 206 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(unable to accept judicial responsibility for deciding whether society's interests sustained a congressional judgment that eighteen-year-olds were sufficiently mature to vote).
72. B. CARDozo, TmE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 88-89 (15th ed. 1952).
73. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1947) (concurring).
74. 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (dissenting).
75. Id. at 16.
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senting in Griswold v. Connecticut,76 and other Justices have similarly understood that their own personal values and interests are not to prevail in
77
application of a jurisprudence of interests.
Critics of a utilitarian jurisprudence have sometimes doubted that the
judicial machinery is adequate to assess the social utility of a proposed rule
and to forecast the impact of a norm upon the society. Professor Rawls has
written: "The principle of utility makes such heavy demands on our ability
to estimate the balance of advantages that it defines at best an ambiguous
court of appeal for questions of justice." 78 Such an attack is obviously not
limited to a jurisprudence of interests, but is a charge addressed to any
sociological or utilitarian jurisprudence. If one accepts the value of a system
of jurisprudence in which the competing interests are balanced, the effort to
identify and assign social weights to these interests is a necessary component
of justice. The judicial machinery is no less competent than the institutions
which presently strike the balance. Legislators daily must endeavor to anticipate the utility of their laws and the impact of new rules upon society. If
anything, a judiciary which is more isolated from temporal passions can,
with greater scholarship and wisdom, make a successful forecast of the consequence of rulings open to the courts. More than any other available system of jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of interests can, when skillfully and
prudentially applied with the methods set forth later in this article, produce
the greatest return in terms of group and individual justice that society has
been able to achieve.
III. MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF INTERESTS

Only societal interests are to be weighed and balanced in constitutional
adjudication, but Supreme Court Justices-influenced by our traditions of
individual right-have placed individual interests upon the scales in opposition to what they have conceived to be group interests. Chief Justice Warren saw the judicial role as one "of accommodating the interests of the Government with the rights and privileges of individuals." 7 9 For example,
when a citizen claimed he was justified in refusing to testify before Congress, the Chief Justice wrote: "Accommodation of the Congressional need
for particular information with the individual and personal interest in privacy

76. 381 U.S. 479, 530-31 (1965).
77. "[I]t cannot be said that a judge's responsibility . . . vests him with unrestricted personal discretion." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (opinion by Goldberg, J.,
with whom Warren, C.J., & Brennan, J., join, concurring).
78. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 91 (1971).
79. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195 (1957).
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is an arduous and delicate task for any court."8s0 Justice Harlan, in Barenblatt v. United States,"' perceived the interests to be accommodated as
"public" versus "private": "Where First Amendment rights are asserted to
bar governmental interrogation 'resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in
the particular circumstances shown." 8 2 Justice Marshall viewed the Court's
task similiarly: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 83
Justice Black, no great believer in the balancing of societal interests in
first amendment cases, was astute enough to see that the misguided efforts
of many of his brethren in balancing "individual" interests against "governmental," "state," or "public" interests were serious misunderstandings of
a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional adjudication and were necessarily dangerous to the interest of our society in freedom of communication. In
the Barenblatt decision Justice Black informed his colleagues that when a
Justice
balances the right of the Government to preserve itself, against
Barenblatt's right to refrain from revealing Communist affiliations
[he] mistakes the factors to be weighed [and] completely leaves out
the real interest in Barenblatt's silence, the interest of the people
as a whole in being able to join organizations . . . without later
being subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to
rather than Barenblatt's own right to sithink for themselves ....
lence, which I think the Court should put on the balance against
the demands of the Government, if any balancing process is to be
tolerated.8 4
Dean Roscoe Pound saw the danger to sound constitutional adjudication
from balancing "private" against "public" interests. He wrote in 1943:
When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with
respect to other claims or demands, we must be careful to compare
them on the same plane. If we put one as an individual interest
decide the question in
and the other as a social interest we may
85
advance in our very way of putting it.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 198.
360 U.S. 109 (1959).
Id. at 126.
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (dissenting).
Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1943).

842

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:823

Capable courts understand that they are to be concerned in constitutional adjudication only with societal interests. To illustrate, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after noting that the litigants
had personal interests involved, added that "far weightier than they are the
public interests in First Amendment freedoms."8s6
Regrettably, some Supreme Court Justices have thought their task was
that of placing governmental interests on the scales in opposition to various
other concerns. 87 Of course, legitimate societal concerns are at times advanced by public servants just as by citizens, but an interest is to be placed
upon the scales in constitutional adjudication only because it is of value to
the society, not because it is advanced by some functionary upon behalf of
the "government," the "establishment," or the "state." In a free society no
governmental interests are ever to be placed upon the judicial scales to outweigh the societal interest in freedom.
On occasion, instead of balancing societal interests, Justices of the Court
have thought balancing was to be done between "rights" of the plaintiff and
"rights" of the defendant. 88 Some scholars comparably have looked
upon
constitutional adjudication as a clash of rights. 89 It is at best a pleasant
phrase to state that the rights of some cannot be honored "in disregard of
the rights of others," 90 but it provides neither adequate insight into the
judicial function nor aid to a court in the responsibility of deciding concrete
cases. Whatever may be deemed the role of a court applying private law, in
constitutional adjudication a tribunal is not to balance "private rights." In a
defamation case, for example, a court that weighs the right of the victim
against the right of the publisher horribly misconceives the task of interessenjurisprudenz. The Court has begun to give evidence that it understands
this.91 In 1974, noting that a state has "the important and legitimate interest of maintaining the integrity of elections," the Supreme Court remarked: "This legitimate state interest, however, must be achieved by a
means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued
availability of political opportunity." 9 2 It then added most significantly:
"The interests involved are not merely those of parties or individual candidates; the voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or
86. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972).
87. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178

(1957).
88. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
89. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 36 (1968).
90. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
91. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (emphasis added).
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parties or both and it is this broad interest that must be weighed in the
balance." 93
On a few occasions Supreme Court Justices have spoken as though they
conceived their task in constitutional adjudication to be one of balancing
"principles." In 1953 the Court spoke of the need for "[a]ccommodation of
these contending principles-the one underlying the power of Congress to
investigate, the other at the basis of the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment." 94 Thirteen years later the Justices spoke in comparable language:
There are two complementary principles to be reconciled in this
case. One is the right of the individual to pick his own associates
so as to express his preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his
private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses. The
other is the constitutional ban in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment against state-sponsored racial inequal95
ity.
Legal principles devoid of societal interest have no place on the scales of
constitutional adjudication. If supported by social utility, they are apt to be
propositions so broadly stated as to be of little help to a court that must
decide concrete controversies or, at best, encapsulated versions of how particular societal interests have been resolved under identified circumstances.
Nothing is to be gained by attempts at balancing principles; rather, courts in
constitutional adjudication must confine their evaluations and adjustments to
societal interests.
IV. THE JuDICI-L

PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE SOCIETAL

INTERESTS DESERVING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

Every society has a system of values or a hierarchy of interests which the
institutions of that society are charged with protecting. The basic interests of
some societies have been relatively constant, but with the passage of time
certain interests become less important while new interests appear that deserve protection. Professor Friedrich aptly noted that "as new interests arise
in the community, they will clamor for recognition as soon as they become
sufficiently weighty to arouse a sizable group of people to rally to their sup96
port."
A society must have some means of identifying its basic interests and
must provide some method of ranking these interests so that they may be
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 718.
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953).
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.. 296, 298 (1966).
C. FUED~iCH, CONSTrruTIONAL GovENMENT ANo DEMOCRACY 162 (4th ed. 1968).
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adjusted in clashing situations by some organ of the state: legislative, executive, or judicial. It is "both possible and necessary, for any given society,"
wrote Julius Stone, "to set out in an ordered scheme the interests to which
its law ought to give effect." 97 "Interests are derived from inspection of the
claims actually made in societies," 98 as Professor Sawer noted. He added
trenchantly: "The task of the law is to classify these interests, to decide in
the light of some system of values which interests should be given effect to
and to what extent."99
In the United States the ultimate identification of the societal interests
deserving of constitutional protection is the task of the United States Supreme Court as interpreter of the Constitution. Although a few Justices of
that Court have said that it is not within their powers to identify new interests to be constitutionally safeguarded ' 0 0 -that this is solely the function
of constitutional amendment-analysis finds them with their colleagues participating in the Supreme Court's identification of new societal interests
worthy of constitutional protection.'10 The responsibility of ascertaining and
announcing what societal interests are so fundamental as to be constitutionally protected requires of the Court, in the words of Justice Harlan, a "solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." 102
These basic values are found, first of all, in the written Constitution. For
example, the contract clause manifests a strong societal interest in the security of transactions; the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment expresses the enduring interest of our society in equal justice and
opportunity; the first amendment is testimony to the profound commitment
of our society to the interests in communication and religion; and equally
deep commitments are evidenced by the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights. The Supreme Court readily acknowledges that it has "increasingly
looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights]" to ascertain the
important values or interests of our society. 10 3
The Constitution is not the only source from which the Court may derive
important societal interests, however. The task of the judge in ascertaining
the fundamental interests of our society that are so basic as to be deserving

97. Stone, A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice, 20 IoWA L. REv. 531, 541 (1935).
98. G. SAWER, LAW IN SOCIETY 150 (1965).
99. Id.
100. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
101. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting, apparently quite willing to recognize a new constitutional right or interest in the "newsman's privilege."); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (Black, J., joining the opinion of the Court recognizing the new
constitutional right of freedom of association).
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (concurring).
103. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 18 (1967) (brackets appearing in Benton).
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of constitutional protection is generally the same as that of the legislator-to
draw his knowledge of these interests and priorities of his society, as Justice
Cardozo pointed out many years ago "from experience and study and reflection." 104

A. Identifying Protectable Societal Interests
1. Reference to the Legitimate Claims of Free Men and Women
In a free society, a judiciary concerned with ascertaining societal interests must determine, and honor, the legitimate claims of free men and
women. The French scholar, Professor Rene Capitant, accurately commented that "there exists an irreducible minimum of individual liberty
which proceeds from the very nature of man and the demand of human
beings. Without it, man would cease to be man." 10 5 When our society
constitutionalized "liberty" in both the fifth and fourteenth amendments, it
clearly manifested the concern that the legitimate claims of citizens to freedom be safeguarded by our legal institutions. "The Fourteenth Amendment," Justice Frankfurter explained, "did mean to withdraw from the
States the right to act in ways that are offensive to a decent respect for the
dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom." Admitting that "these are very
broad terms," he nevertheless admonished that "the duty of such adjudication on a basis no less narrow has been committed to this Court."1 06
Given the heritage of a jurisprudence of individualism, characterized for
over our first hundred years at least by doctrinal espousal of natural rights, it
is understandable that, instead of articulating societal interests, the Supreme
Court virtually always spoke of individual rights, first labelled as "natural"
rights and more recently, as "fundamental rights." One might expect that in
identifying new rights the Court would explain their fundamentality,
perhaps in terms of social utility, but the language employed is customarily
either conclusory or too vague to divulge why the rights preferred by the
Court deserve constitutional protection or paramountcy over opposing interests of society. When in 1888 the Supreme Court held for the first time
that freedom of enterprise was sufficiently fundamental in our society to be
protected as a constitutional right, it provided only the explanation that "the
privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade . . . is an essential part of
10 7 Likewise,
. . liberty."
freedom to pursue a chosen vocation was to be
*

104. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
105. Capitant, La crise et la reforme du parlamentarisme en France, 1936 JAHRBUCH DES
OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 14.
106. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947).
107. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888) (concurring).
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protected, the Court announced in Meyer v. Nebraska,10 8 because it was
part of "liberty." Two years later the Court added that the right to educate
one's children as one chose was to be constitutionally protected because it
was embraced within "the fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this union repose." 109 In ruling for the first time that freedom
of association was to be constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court simply said: "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty'
assured by the Due Process Clause." 110 When in 1965 the Court held that
the privacy right deserved constitutional recognition, it gave only the explanation that the right "is a legitimate one." 1 1
Broader statements proffered by the Supreme Court to explain their conclusion of fundamentality, or a justification for giving constitutional protection to various claims or interests, have not been much more illuminating.
When the Court says that rights are to be protected when they are part of
"the concept of ordered liberty," 11 2 or part of "the traditions and conscience
of our people," la or because they are seemingly mandated by those "canons of decency and fairness which express .the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples," 1 1 4 one is virtually forced to agree with the conclusion of
Professor McWhinney that "[c]oncepts such as these are so vaguely and
loosely worded as to allow almost any content to be poured into them." ' 1 5
Nevertheless, a number of legitimate claims are readily identifiable as
necessary to the preservation of a free society. A basic claim of all free men
and women is their entitlement to be free from slavery and involuntary servitude. This is universally identified in our community as a societal interest
demanding protection. 11 6 The claim of the individual to integrity, dignity,
and decency readily qualifies as a societal interest deserving of constitutional
protection, and both the eighth -amendment and a host of cases demonstrate
1 17
the community's legitimate concern.
108. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See id.: "[T]his Court has not attempted to define with exact-.
ness the liberty . .. guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment]..
109. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
110. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
112. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
113. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); accord, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
114. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947).
115. McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-Making, 39 MINN.
L. REV. 837, 850 (1955).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
117. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Under the eighth amendment, wrote Justice Brennan, "[tihe primary principal is that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to
the dignity of human beings.'- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (concurring).
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The pursuit of happiness was deemed a natural right by the founding
fathers, 11 and our society has a recognized interest in honoring this claim of
the individual. Constitutional protection must be given to "those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 1119 The individual's claim to be able to develop his
talents and personality is clearly embraced within the protected interest of
the society. Every society ought to secure to all its members, so far as possible, the opportunity to develop their individual talents and powers so far
as they can without detriment to one another or to the well-being of the
society as a whole. 120 The object of the state, observed the distinguished
French Professor Waline, is "to guarantee the individual the liberties necessary for the development of his personality." 1 21 In 1888 Justice Field
noted: "With the gift of life there necessarily goes to everyone the right to
do all such acts, and follow all such pursuits, not inconsistent with the equal
rights of others, as may support life and add to the happiness of its possessor." 122
Embraced, too, within the general societal interest indicated is the
legitimate claim of the individual to marry and procreate. "The freedom to
marry," said the Supreme Court in 1967, "has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.''123
Also contained within the protected concept of "pursuit of happiness" is
what we customarily refer to as freedom of enterprise. Justice Bradley wrote
in 1884: "The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an
inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence .... This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen." 1 24 In recognizing a societal concern
for what we call freedom of contract, the Supreme Court said in 1897, with
reference to the fourteenth amendment:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to-earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose enter into all
118. C. ANTIEAU,
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

RIGHTS OF OUR FATHERS 2 (1968).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
See 1). RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGiTS 139 (1924).
M. WALINE, L.INDIVIDUALISME ET LE DROIT 46 (1945).
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692 (1888).
Loving v. Virginia, 308 U.S. 112 (1967).
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884).
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contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above men25

tioned. 1

All these aspects of the "pursuit of happiness" are seen to be societal interests by contemporary courts. "The Supreme Court," in the language of
one federal judge, "has created a sphere of protectable interests, including,
but not limited to, the interests specifically designated in the first eight
amendments, as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
26
men." 1
The "incidents of freedom" are to be constitutionally protected as societal
interests, and among such incidents, says the Supreme Court, first amendment values "hold a preferred position." ' 27 Moreover, our community recognizes a societal interest in honoring the legitimate claims of individuals to
fair proceedings in dealing with the state, and in criminal prosecutions a
number of rights have been deemed fundamental because they were consid28
ered "essential to a fair trail."'
Although legitimate claims to dignity, decency, integrity, equality, expression, and fairness in relations with the state and others are interests of
the individual, they are characteristic of the society; therefore, in applying
the methods of jurisprudence of interests these individual concerns are
weighed as societal interests. Indeed, interessenjurisprudenzshould produce
more judicial rulings protective of these claims than the holdings of the past
which primarily resulted from viewing such disputes as a clash between individual rights and the state.

2. The Nature and Needs of a Free Society
There are "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions," 129 according to the Supreme
Court, and it was with recourse to these that the Court decided in times
past which rights were sufficiently fundamental to be made binding upon the
states. Whether defined as "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," 130 "ultimate decency in a civilized society," 131 or "[e]xperience with

125. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
126. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Md. 1973) (Young, J.).
127. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953).
128. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
129. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 102 (1908), quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
448 (1890).
130. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
131. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947).
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the requirements of a free society," 132 the attributes deemed characteristic
of the society are a reference for determining which societal interests are to
be given constitutional protection.
There is general agreement that a free society must be characterized by a
free flow of information, ideas, and intelligence. The distinguished Norwegian scholar, Professor Frede Castberg, has written: "First and foremost free
discussion and a wide measure of freedom of information has been regarded
as necessary to any effective democracy."' 3 3 Justice Holmes was certain
34
that "Etihe ultimate good . . . is better reached by free trade in ideas."'
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in 1937, wrote that it is
imperative ... to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of
free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes,
if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.' 35
In his veto message on the McCarran Act before Congress, President Truman said: "To permit freedom of expression is primarily for the benefit of
the majority because it protects criticism and criticism leads to progress." 36 "The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," '3 7 said Justice Douglas for the Supreme Court in
1949. He added: "[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas
that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful
change is effected."138
A free society is one in which individuals can move freely within the
nation and, if so disposed, depart the country. It must be characterized by a
willingness to honor the claim of the individual to develop his talents and
skills as he desires, and to lead the life style most compatible with his
philosophy. Furthermore, a free society does not grant to the political state
a monopoly of economic power, but acknowledges the claim of the individual and his associates to freedom of enterprise. Embraced, too, within
the economic aspects of a free federal society is the group interest in the
free movement of goods and trade throughout the nation.

132. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (opinion by Goldberg, J., with whom
Warren, C.J., & Brennan, J., join, concurring), quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133. F. CASTBERG, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST 422 (1960).
134. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting).
135. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
136. Appearing in Z. CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 138 (1956).
137. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
138. Id.; accord, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (opinion by Stewart, J., with
whom Brennan & Marshall, JJ., join, dissenting).
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3. The Lessons of History
"Continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history" is necessary in constitutional adjudication.' 3 9 Accordingly, in deciding whether an
interest is deserving of constitutional protection, a court will ascertain
whether it has traditionally and historically been honored. "The gloss may
140
be the deposit of history," suggested Justice Frankfurter.
The Supreme Court has continually looked "to the 'traditions . . . of our
people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] as to be
ranked as fundamental,' "141 and this practice' will probably continue. The
Court has at times looked to English law prior to our separation to ascertain
if a right or interest was part of our enduring society.' 42 For example, in
holding fundamental the right to a public trial, the Court noted protection of
the right in English law dating back to the abolition of the Star Chamber in
1641.143 And, when justifying its conclusion that the right to a speedy trial
was fundamental, the Court explained that it "has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage." ' 44 It is certainly true, as Justice
Holmes concluded, that "[i]f a thing has been practiced for two hundred
years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth
45
Amendment to affect it." 1
In many instances our Constitution was intended to repudiate English
values at the time of separation, so a societal interest generally recognized in
the United States is not to be denied constitutional protection because it has
no historical roots in England. The Supreme Court, in cases involving the
clash of interests between communication and the integrity of the judicial
process, has at least twice "rejected the idea that the interests were to be
accommodated by applying the common law of England at the time the
46
Constitution was adopted." 1

139. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
140. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (opinion by Goldberg, J., with whom
Warren, C.J., & Brennan, J., join, concurring); accord, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934).
142. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled
usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited
to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
143. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-71 (1948); accord, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
821-32 (1975).
144. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
145. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
146. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384 n.5 (1962).
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As another source of constitutional construction courts have frequently
looked at the common law prevailing in the states at the time the Constitution was adopted,1 47 and it is likely that in seeking the lessons of history,
courts will continue to be guided by this source in determining whether an
148
interest has been part of our traditional values.
In addition, respect for the lessons of history prompts a court charged
with determining the importance of a right or interest to investigate the
common law after the adoption of the Constitution and, indeed, all the historical experience and heritage of our society. When the Supreme Court
decided the right to travel was worthy of constitutional protection, for instance, it explained that this right was "engrained in our history" and "a part
of our heritage."1 49 "Liberty" is to be defined, according to the Court, by
reference to "those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."1 50 When concerned with
defining the particular rights that should be protected under the umbrella of
due process, Justice Harlan stated:
Apart from the approach taken by the absolute incorporationists, I can see only one method of analysis that has any
internal logic. That is to start with the words "liberty" and "due
process of law" and attempt to define them in a way that accords
151
with American traditions and our system of government.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to deny constitutional protection
to asserted claims because they were not supported by our history. Noting
that obscenity was an offense when the Constitution was adopted and has
remained so disfavored, the Court remarked: "In light of this history, it is
apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not
intended to protect" asserted rights to distribute such literature. 1 52 Again,
in 1972 when the Court held that a newsman has no constitutional right to
refuse to divulge his sources when questioned by a grand jury investigating
crime, the Court emphasized that the common iz w recognized no such
right. The lesson taught by history, according to the Court, is that a newsman's right to refuse to divulge his sources is not necessary to the free flow
53
of information. '
147. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25-(1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
148. "The Constitution . . . must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution." United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898).
149. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
150. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
151. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (dissenting).
152. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
153. Branzburg v. Haves, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Notwithstanding respect for the record of history, however, a societal
interest widely accepted in contemporary America is not to be denied solely
because it was not part of either the common law or our historical heritage.
Justice Frankfurter agreed with this view of a progressing law: "It is of the
very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed
reasonable and right." 15 "[D]evelopment of the community's sense of justice," said Justices Harlan and Clark-both of whom strongly appreciated
historical materials-will in time "lead to the expansion of the protection
which due process affords"' 55 and to constitutional protection for societal
interests not identified or fully appreciated by our forebears.
4. Legislative, Executive, and Administrative Materials
The magnitude of a societal interest can also be ascertained in part by
investigating the extent to which it has been protected in private law, a
practice followed by the Supreme Court. The fact that the right of privacy,
for example, has been extensively protected by our legislatures and courts in
private law undoubtedly influenced the Court to conclude it was a societal
1 56
interest deserving of constitutional protection.
Enactments of national, state, and local legislatures provide exceptional
evidence 'of interests considered most important by the society.' 5 7 The
United States Supreme Court has often looked to legislative materials to
determine whether various claims or rights were to be protected. 58 As
Justice Frankfurter explained: "[A] fair reflex, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, of the underlying feelings of our society" can be found by refer59
ence to legislation enacted in the various states.'
In resolving constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has also looked to
practices of the executive branch. Thus, in 1925, in ruling that the President could pardon contempts of court, it observed: "[C]riminal contempts of
a federal court have been pardoned for eighty-five years .... Such long
practice under the pardoning power and acquiescence in it strongly sustain
the construction it is based on." ' 60 In 1974 when the Supreme Court ruled
that Presidents could pardon on condition, it justified its ruling by noting
"that Presidents throughout our history as a Nation have exercised the
power to pardon or commute sentences upon conditions that are not specifi-

154. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
155. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15 (1964) (dissenting).
156. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
157. E.g., State Right of Privacy Statutes; see Donahue v. Warner Bros., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272
P.2d 177 (1954) (regarding such statutes).
158. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
159. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 21 (1950) (dissenting).
160. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118-19 (1925).
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cally authorized by statute." 1 61 In holding that an adjournment at the end
of the first session of the 69th Congress prevented the President from returning a bill and made a pocket veto permissible, the Supreme Court in
1929 said its conclusion was "confirmed by the practical construction that has
been given to it by the Presidents through a long course of years in which
Congress has acquiesced. Long settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions
162
of this character."
Rulings and regulations of federal administrative agencies, authorized by
the Congress,. can also provide clues to important societal interests and to
how, in the event of a conflict, they should be adjusted. To illustrate, the
"fairness doctrine" of the Federal Communications Commission has influenced the Supreme Court in its task of adjusting societal interests between
the need for communication and the concern for the good name of individuals.1 6 Long-standing and widely accepted regulations of federal administrative agencies may divulge to a court, as fully as legislative enactments, the
important interests of the social group.
5. The Expressed Values of the American States and Comparable Cultures
In construing the Constitution in its broad clauses, and in seeking to
determine how highly the society respects certain rights, the Supreme Court
has frequently looked to state constitutions, legislation, and judicial decision. 164 The Court announced in 1934:
The fact that a practice is followed by a large number of states is
not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice accords
with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice "offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." 1 5
Many decisions of the Court have relied on this interpretive device. "[A]
fair reflex, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, of the underlying feel-

161. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974).
162. Okanogan Indians v. United States (The Pocket Veto Case), 279 U.S. 655, 688-89
(1929).
163. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); CBS, Jnc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ('[Iln
evaluating ... First Amendment claims ... we -must
afford great weight to the decision of Congress and the experience of the Commission [since]
Congress and its chosen regulatory agency have established a delicately balanced system of
regulation intended to serve the interests of all concerned.").
164. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
165. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934).
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ings of our society," can be found by referring to state legislation and practices, said Justice Frankfurter, urging that societal well-being required a
constitutional ruling making it impermissible for the government to put to
death individuals who were insane.' 66 The fact that every American state
guaranteed the right of trial by jury in criminal prosecutions strongly persuaded the Court that the right was fundamental. The Court noted in 1968:
"The constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed jury trial. Also,
the constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter in one form or
another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases." 16 7 A year later,
holding fundamental the ban upon double jeopardy, the Court explained:
"Today, every State incorporates some form of the prohibition in its constitution or common law."1 68 Again, in holding that the right to a speedy
trial is fundamental, the Supreme Court indicated its awareness that "each
69
of the 50 States guarantees the right to a speedy trial to its citizens." 1
Comparably, when the Court held the right to a public trial fundamental, it
170
emphasized that the right was protected by virtually every state.
Conversely, when a majority of the states does not by constitution,
common law, or statute honor a particular claim, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to find the right fundamental. To illustrate, in 1971 the
Court noted that at least twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia
denied jury trials in juvenile court proceedings and then held there was no
federal constitutional right to such trials.171 Under a jurisprudence of interests analysis, as in the past, the courts in adjudicating controversies under
the Federal Constitution will continue to use state constitutions, statutes,
and decisions as one factor indicating the important interests of society and
demonstrating how the community feels they should be reconciled.
In delineating the interests of our society and in determining how clashing societal interests should be adjusted, American courts must also be encouraged to look to the values and the solutions of comparable law cultures.
More than his colleagues, Justice Frankfurter was willing to utilize comparative materials, especially laws and judicial rulings from the British Commonwealth. 172 After noting that ten jurisdictions within the United Kingdom and British Commonwealth had refused to apply the exclusionary rule
to evidence illegally seized, Justice Frankfurter observed in Wolf v. Colorado 173 that "most of the English-speaking world does not regard as vital to
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 21 (1950) (dissenting).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-68 (1948).
McKeiver .v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained"' 74 and that the
interests of our society, as understood at the time, did not require such
exclusion. Stressing that'"approximately seventy other jurisdictions in the
world ... celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning
capital punishment," Justice Marshall argued that this must also be an interest of our society and the proper interpretation of our Constitution.175
Admittedly, it is unlikely that any other society has a value structure identical to ours, but we are heirs not only of the English experience but of the
Western World, and the Supreme Court must be encouraged to look, much
more than in the past, at the identification and resolution of societal interests by comparable cultures.

6. Community Conscience and Public Opinion
A court concerned with identifying the values of the society deserving
protection under the Constitution may legitimately inquire into the moral
sense of the society, the ethical values of the group, the community conscience, and public opinion. Wrote Justice Cardozo, there must be "an appeal to the experience and sentiments and moral and economic judgments of
the community" to ascertain the interests deserving of constitutional protection.' 76 The Supreme Court has often looked to "the community conscience" to determine constitutional construction, 1 77 and it has frequently
attested that it will determine whether claims are to be given constitutional
safeguard by reference to the "principles of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people" as to be deemed fundamental. 1 78 In 1950
Justice Frankfurter could aptly state that "[i]t is now the settled doctrine of
this Court that the Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based
on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by
79
our whole history." 1
Just as legislators from the earliest of times have given legitimate consideration to the views of their community, so too courts concerned with constitutional adjudication may make reference to the views, the opinions, and
the feelings of their society. While a professor of law at Harvard, Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
174. Id. at 29.
175. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 371 (1972) (concurring).
176. B. CARDozo, THE; PARuADoxES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 75 (1928).
177. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
178. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); accord, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285 (1936).
179. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1951) (dissenting).
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To a large extent the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional interpretation of words whose contents are derived from the
disposition of the Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but
controlling thing, the general drift of public opinion. i8 0
Supreme Court Justices would be well advised, he wrote, "to gather meaning, not from reading the Constitution, but from reading life." 18 '
B. The Interests Presently Identified by the Supreme
Court as Deserving Constitutional Protection
In almost two centuries of existence the United States Supreme Court
has identified most of the substantial interests of our society deserving constitutional protection, and worthy of being placed on the judicial scales in
opposition to other societal interests with which they at times clash. The
interests of our society, already identified by the Court as values worthy of
protection under the Constitution, include:
82
(a) the interest in freedom of communication and religion,1
(b) the interest in the liberty of the individual, embracing many particulars, such as
l 3
(1) the interest that no person be held in slavery or peonage,
i 4
(2) the interest in freedom of the individual to travel, '
85
(3) the interest in freedom of enterprise and contract,1
(4) the interest in giving breathing space to individuals in the expression of their personalities,18 6 and
87
(5) the interest in freedom from an establishment of religion,'
(c) the interest in equality of law and opportunity, 8
(d) the interest in protecting private property, 8 9
90
(e) the interest in peace, safety, and good order,1

180. F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 197 (Prichard & MacLeish eds. 1939).
181. Id. at 30.
182. "The fundamental law declares the interest of the United States that the free exercise of
religion be not prohibited and that freedom to communicate information and opinion be not
abridged." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
184. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
185. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
186. Liberty includes "the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's
intellect, interests, tastes and personality." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mere., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
187. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
188. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
189. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
190. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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the interest in protecting private reputation, 191
192
the interest in protecting the privacy of the individual,
193
the interest in protecting the public health,
the interest in protecting public morality,1 94
the interest in protecting the security of the state, 195
the interest in the fair and effective administration of justice, 196
97
the interest in an effective educational process,1
(in) the interest in protecting the legislative process, 198
(n) the interest in the integrity of the electoral process, 19 .
20 0
(o) the interest in the continued availability of political opportunity,
and
201
(p) the interest in safeguarding the security of transactions.
While some of these have been identified as individual rather than societal
interests by the Court, they are, in fact, societal concerns to be balanced in
applying the method of interessetjurisprudenz advocated here. Each one
reflects a value of a free society, necessary for the survival of our way of life.
Nevertheless, each interest assumes a greater or lesser importance when it
comes into conflict with another societal interest depending upon the state
of contemporary culture. When the Court correctly identifies these interests
and acknowledges in its opinions that it is balancing one against another, it
is applying a jurisprudence of interests.
(0
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(1)

V.

APPLYING A JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS

A. Judicial Methods Other Than Balancing Appropriate
to a Jurisprudenceof Interests
Although illustrations are by now readily available from many areas of
constitutional law, the experience of the United States Supreme Court and
other tribunals applying a jurisprudence of interests analysis has been most
extensive in the area involving the first amendment. While the following
analysis of methodology at work will, therefore, focus upon the resolution of
competing interests in the first amendment area, the methods discussed are
generally applicable to the analysis of other constitutional issues.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Rosenblatt-v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
Columbia Ry., Gas & Elee. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923).
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The task of balancing opposed societal interests requires a high degree of
judicial skill and a conviction on the part of the judge that a particular
societal interest is more important under the circumstances than an opposing
interest. Consequently, it can be expected that Supreme Court Justices will
avoid such balancing if they can arrive at a just result in any other acceptable way. Writing for the Court in 1967, Chief Justice Warren declined an
invitation from counsel to balance openly the societal interest in communication and association against society's interest in state security:
It has been suggested that this case should be decided by
"balancing" the governmental interest . . . against the First
Amendment rights asserted by the appellee. This we decline to do.
We recognize that both interests are substantial, but we deem it
inappropriate for this Court to label one as being more important
or more substantial
than the other. Our inquiry is more cir20 2
cumscribed.
Rather than approaching the protection of the interests through a balancing
analysis, the Court voided the governmental control as impermissibly broad
and thus protected the interest in communication and association. Although
the Chief Justice did not reach the propriety of judicial balancing of societal
interests in constitutional adjudication, he misconceived the nature of the
task as one of balancing governmental interests against individual rights.
However, the case is illustrative of many techniques utilized by the Court to
arrive at a just result without actually weighing and balancing the opposed
societal interests. These techniques require identification and discussion.
First, a court concerned with constitutional adjudication can properly invalidate legislative or executive action impinging upon a societal interest,
such as freedom of expression, when the restrictive action is not within the
constitutional power of the governmental entity or official imposing the restraint.2 0 3 Second, a court can avoid balancing societal interests when, for
any reason, it finds the legislation void on its face. For example, the Court
has consistently declared void legislation restricting speech when that legislation was so unclear, vague, and indefinite that a person desiring to communicate could not reasonably determine what to avoid in order to remain
law-abiding.204 Third, the Court can avoid the balancing of interests by
invalidating statutes demanding licenses or permits of those who would engage in communication on the grounds that the legislative body failed to
provide adequate standards to the public official given the power to deny
202. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
203. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (White, C.J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting).
204. Bagget v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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the license or permit. 20 5 Fourth, the Courts may also void legislation
which, attempting to protect one interest, unnecessarily and too broadly impacts upon another important societal interest. 20 6 "It is not sufficient for
the State to show that [its] requirements further a very substantial state
interest .... In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot choose
means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity." 20 7 As an example, the Court will only sustain legislation which,
although designed to protect another interest, restricts first amendment interests "if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 208 Since
"all society, and not merely . . .those exercising their rights, might be the
loser," overly broad statutes impinging upon freedom of communication
20 9
must be voided.
Fifth, without ever coming to a weighing of the competing societal interests but assuming that the interest intended to be protected by governmental action is an important one, the Supreme Court properly voids
such action when it is not necessary to protect the asserted government
interest. To illustrate, in voiding a state court decree preventing a labor
union from assisting its members in litigation arising out of employment, the
Supreme Court concluded: "The decree at issue here thus substantially impairs the associational rights of the Mine Workers and is not needed to pro'2 1 0
tect the State's interest in high standards of legal ethics."
"[G]overnmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny," in the language of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White, "only upon a clear showing
that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial
governmental interest." 211 In invalidating discriminations in welfare assistance which, in effect, inhibited the free exercise of the right to travel, the
Supreme Court announced that "any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a com' 2 12
pelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."
Sixth, without actually weighing competing societal interests, courts in
constitutional adjudication may void governmental action allegedly designed
to protect one interest when proof indicates that there is a substantial interference with a worthy second interest and there is no clear showing that the
governmental action substantially safeguards or advances the former in205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967).
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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terest.2 13 The Supreme Court applied this technique in passing upon
Arizona's long-train law which seriously interfered with the movement of
interstate commerce. The Court voided the statute, which purported to be a
public safety measure, upon proof that, in practice, the act resulted in more,
rather than fewer, accidents. Said the Court: "The decisive question is
whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure
in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it ....
214
There must be both a "rational relation"' 2 1 5 and a "substantial relation" 21r- between governmental action, such as legislation, and the interest
sought to be protected, or it will be unconstitutional. The Court has been
most ready to apply this -rule where constitutionally recognized societal values are infringed upon or negated by the governmental action.2 17 The Supreme Court, invalidating a municipal ordinance requiring the NAACP to
furnish city officials with a list of the local members, stated:
[G]overnmental action does not automatically become reasonably
related to the achievement of a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose by mere assertion in the preamble of an ordinance. When it is shown that state action threatens significantly to
impinge upon constitutionally protected freedom it becomes the
duty of this Court to determine whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement
of the governmental purpose
2 18
asserted as its justification.
Therefore, the Court will void statutory disclosure requirements when there
is no " 'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed." 219 Similarly, the
Court will require that any interrogation of citizens conducted by public
servants in the exercise of general investigative authority be closely related
to an important societal interest. 220 The Supreme Court has said:
[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation
which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of
213. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S.
520 (1959).
214. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945).
215. Cleveland Bd. of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974).
216. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179,
186 (1950).
217. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
218. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
219. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
220. DeGregory v. New Hampshire Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
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speech, press, association and petition that the State convincingly
show a substantial relation between the information221sought and a
subject of overriding and compelling state interest.
Whenever any important societal interest is affected by governmental action,
the Court will void such action when "the requisite rational relation" 22 2 between the action and the interest intended to be protected is absent. For
example, in holding unconstitutional overly restrictive maternity leave regulations, the Supreme Court in 1974 explained that it did so because "the
arbitrary cutoff dates embodied in the mandatory leave rules .... "have no
rational relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of
223
instruction."
Seventh, in constitutional adjudication there is no need for a tribunal to
weigh and balance opposing societal interests when legislative or executive
action which affects another important societal interest, such as communication, either on its face or in its application subjects certain individuals or
groups to unreasonable discrimination. 224 Justice Marshall was speaking for
the Court in 1972 when he said:
[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it
may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in
public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of
ideas," and government must afford all points of view an equal
225
opportunity to be heard.
When adjudicating constitutional conflicts of interests, the Supreme
Court has at times been inclined to avoid weighing and balancing opposing
interests when governmental action protective of one interest has affected
226
the societal interest in communication in the form of a "prior restraint."
However, the Court has suggested that "absolute" bans upon prior restraints
do not represent acceptable judicial craftsmanship. Rather a court must
weigh and balance the opposing societal interests in constitutional controversies before deciding whether our society should or should not accept prior
227
restraints upon some forms of communication.
221. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
222. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 114 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
223. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974).
224. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
225. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
226. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
227. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973). Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger announced: "We categorically disapprove the theory, apparently adopted by the
trial judge, that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity from state regulation .. ."Id.
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B. Balancing the Opposing Interests
If the techniques previously noted are not appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case, or productive of the just result, the Supreme Court and other tribunals concerned with constitutional adjudication
must then identify clearly the opposed societal interests. Faced with actual
litigation, a court cannot accomplish its task operating solely on a level of
generalities, for example, by weighing society's broad interest in communication against equally broad societal interests such as state security, or
peace, safety, and good order. "It must never be forgotten," wrote Professor
Chafee, "that the balancing cannot be properly done unless all the interests
involved are adequately ascertained .... "228
In approaching a first amendment case, the Court must identify the
societal interest both in the particular content of the communication and in
the specific means used to communicate and then must weigh these concerns against the particular subinterest embraced within, for example, the
broad social interest in peace, safety, and good order. The Supreme Court
has recognized some utterances as having greater social utility than others.
In placing "beyond the pale" whole groups of communications because of
their content, the Court has clearly indicated that, in its judgment, opposed
societal interests that are important and substantial will always outweigh
these particular utterances. In a 1940 case, the Court volunteered the dictum that "resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution,
and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument." 229 Two years later the Court concluded that a class of utterances denominated "fighting words-those which by their very utterance injure or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace [were] of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
2 30
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
While denying these utterances constitutional protection, the Court added
gratuitously that it was prepared also to place "beyond the pale" the "lewd,
231
...obscene, . . . profane and libelous."
In 1976, the Supreme Court, considering the application of first amendment protection to erotic materials, stated: "[I]t is manifest that society's
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate
...."232 Similarly, when Justice Douglas said that "[a] speaker may not,
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1941).

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Id.
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Stevens, J.).
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of course, incite a"riot,"" 3 he undoubtedly expressed a view shared by a
majority of the Court that such' speech did not reflect a strong enough
23 4
societal interest to overcome the competing interest in peace and order.
The Supreme Court has indicated that society's interest in communication is greatest when "pure speech" is involved. Accompanying this position
is the explicit or implied notion that impure speech (whatever this is to the
Court) and certain communicative conduct, such as picketing, deserves a
lesser degree of protection by the society. What the Court is saying by indirection is that, regardless of the societal value in the content of the communication, if it is conveyed in undesirable ways the Court will refuse to
acknowledge fully that value. Justice Goldberg summarized the Court's
opinion:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as
patrolling, .marching and picketing on streets and highways, as
these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech.2 35
Similarly, Justice White, speaking for the Court, remarked that "differences
in the character of new[s] media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them." 23 6 Sustaining the conviction of one who publicly burned his Selective Service registration certificates, Chief Justice War,
ren remarked: "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea." 23 7 He added "that when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
38
freedoms." 2
There is the assumption in these remarks that what the Court calls "noncommunicative conduct" can be readily distinguished from "communicative
conduct," with apparently no consideration being given to the intent of the
citizen who would convey by his conduct what he considers a most impor-

233. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 331 (1951) (dissenting).
234. Nevertheless, the warning of Justices Brandeis and Holmes that no fair and intelligible
line can be drawn to alert a speaker that he is about to pass beyond permissible advocacy into
criminal incitement must always be kept in mind. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672
(1925) (dissenting).
235. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
236. Red Libn Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
237. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
238. Id.
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tant message 2 3 9 Both the attempts to distinguish pure speech from less
pure communication, and efforts to characterize conduct held by the
judiciary to be noncommunicative must be strongly repudiated. First, while
an editorial in the New York Times on foreign policy might strike the
judiciary as pure speech, to the poorer members of our community inexpensive sound amplifiers attached to their cars or hand-made signs expressing opposition to racism carried by solitary pickets 24 o are the only effective
avenues of communication open to them, and it is grossly unfair and unsound to deprecate these media because mechanical means or picketing are
involved. Second, it should by now be well established that the protection of
symbolic speech is a legitimate interest of society because always to the
speaker and generally to his audience there is a message conveyed (frequently more powerful than words). 241 Finally, there are no objective
criteria available to distinguish communicative conduct from noncommunicative conduct. The Justices must abandon their efforts to distinguish from
pure speech all other forms of communication, verbal and symbolic. Attempts at placing "beyond the pale" either methods of communication or
communicative contents are utterly inadequate substitutes for the conscious
weighing and balancing of societal interests required in every case.
Just as the societal interest in all forms of the communicative process is
not the same, so too, the weight of the societal interests opposed to communication will vary with the specific or particular interest embraced within
the larger, generic value. Two examples illustrate this point: interests embraced within the larger and broadly stated interests in state security, and
interests in peace, safety, and good order. The interest in state security
embraces a legitimate concern that the institutions of government not be
overthrown by force so long as the peaceful avenues of democratic change
are generally available. Society's interest in preventing the "[o]verthrow of
the Government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech." 242 Contained, too, within this
broadly stated societal interest in state security are the interests in being
free in wartime from treasonous utterances in support of the enemy, 243 in an
effective system of providing manpower for the defense of the nation, 244 in
regulating organizations controlled by foreign powers, 2 45 in safeguarding

239. Id. at 382.
240. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
241. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
242. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
243. Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951).
244. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
245. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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military and naval establishments,2 4 6 in the dignity of the flag,2 47 and in
sheltering the President from verbal assaults and threats.2 s
Within the societal interest in peace, safety, and good order, deemed at
times sufficient to outweigh the interest in communication, are also many
identifiable subinterests. There is, for example, a clear societal interest in
minimizing noise around schools, 24 9 and the same can certainly be said of
noise around hospitals and courthouses. 250 There is a discernible interest in
protecting against breaches of the peace.2 5 1 In addition there are interests
in keeping secure places of confinement, 252 in protecting the citizen from
schemes to defraud, 253 in safeguarding citizens from being endangered, as
by being forced into the streets by speakers and crowds blocking the
sidewalks, 2 54 and an interest that private gatherings not be disturbed by
intruders and hecklers.2 55 Even momentary reflection makes it clear that
the societal interest is not the same for each subinterest embraced within
the broadly stated societal interest in peace, safety, and good order. Accordingly, when a constitutional court is weighing one of these interests against a
particular interest contained in the first amendment, it must identify with
particularity the opposing subinterest involved, determine the weight accorded to it by society, and balance it agaiiist the value that our society
attaches to the specific kind of communication involved.
The courts' task in balancing societal interests in constitutional controversies requires a high degree of skill and prudence, but again it should be
recognized that the judicial function here closely parallels the work of legislators who daily have to decide that under given circumstances one societal
interest outweighs another. Justices must bring to their task a basic understanding of how their society ranks its values and interests, experience in
legislating and in life itself, competence in forecasting the social result of
adopting new norms, and a high degree of statesmanship. As Justice Cardozo wrote with great insight:

246. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
247. 'Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971), aff'g by an equally divided court, 26 N.Y.2d
114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970).
248. Of this interest the Supreme Court has said, "The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even
an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to
perform his duties without interference from threats of physical violence." Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
249. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
250. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
251. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
252. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1973).
253. Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
254. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
255. In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970).
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If you ask how he is to know when one interest outweighs another,
I can only answer that he must get his knowledge as the legislator
gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life
itself. Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's
work and his. The choice of methods, the appraisement of values,
must in the end be guided by like considerations of the one as for
the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his com256
petence.
1. The Obligation of the Court to Honor Both Competing Societal Interests
Generally, in the adjudication of constitutional controversies, a court has
the obligation to honor, if possible, both competing societal interests. Dean
Roscoe Pound gave this advice: "[S]ecure all interests so far as possible with
the least sacrifice of the totality of interests or the scheme of interests as a
whole." 257 The Supreme Court apparently is willing to honor the obligation to respect competing interests whenever possible. Because the Court
has in the past customarily spoken of individual rights rather than societal
interests, such recognition will be expressed in the language of rights. "Accommodation between the two [opposed rights] must be obtained with as
little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other,"
as the Supreme Court held in 1956.258
The Court has traditionally manifested its commitment to the obligation
to honor both interests, if possible, by interpreting governmental action protective of one interest as narrowly as possible in order to give reasonable
protection to that interest while leaving room for the broadest possible exercise of the opposing interest being restrained by the governmental action. 259 Accordingly, the Supreme Court will interpret legislation so as to
hold it constitutional, if at all possible. "The obligation rests also upon this
Court in construing congressional enactments to take care to interpret them
26 0
so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality."
Occasionally in constitutional adjudication, courts are faced with plaintiffs
and defendants whose arguments are both posited upon the same societal
interest. 261 Here, especially, the courts should acknowledge an obligation

256. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
257. R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 334 (1959). Professor Chafee wrote, "Every reasonable attempt should be made to maintain both interests unimpaired." Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 228,
at 32. What is necessary, according to Professor Patton, is "the working out of effective rules
which will provide reasonable protection for each (interest) with out endangering the others."
G. PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 124 (3d ed. 1964).
258. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). See also Central Hardware
Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544 (1972).
259. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
260. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 120 (1948).
261. See CBS, Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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to honor the claims of both parties. To. illustrate, the California Court, setting aside the conviction of a heckler who annoyed speakers at a public
meeting, ruled that impolite and discourteous utterances from the audience
would be permitted as long as the conduct of the meeting was not shown to
262
be substantially impaired.
2. When One Interest Must Be Preferred
a. ProtectingConduct Expressive of One Societal Interest Unless the Opposed Societal Interest Is Clearly Imperiled. Concomitant with the judicial
obligation to honor both societal interests when they are of approximately
equal value or utility, courts must not condone the punishment of citizens
expressing one important societal interest unless it is clearly proven by the
government or the private party asserting another societal interest that the
latter interest is clearly and seriously endangered.
Professor Chafee wrote in 1920 that
our problem of locating the boundary line of free speech is solved
[when] courts realize that the principle on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful involves the balancing against each
other of two very important social interests, in public safety and in
search for truth, [and when judges recognize that] the great interest in free speech should be sacrificed
only when the interest in
263
public safety is really imperiled.
It must be clear, held the United States Supreme Court, that there are
"substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities" before he can be
penalized. 264 Furthermore, legislation restricting first amendment interests,
the Supreme Court said in 1966, would only be sustained if "narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State." 265 Although the wording
of the test was modified in subsequent cases, 266 the principal utility of the
clear and present danger statement was to make clear to the courts the
necessity of finding that the citizen exercising first amendment freedoms had
clearly, seriously, and imminently endangered the opposing societal interest.
Governmental action protective of one societal interest, but affecting
another significant societal interest, will be sustained when the Supreme

262. In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970).
263. Z. CHAFEE, JR., supra note 228, at 38.
264. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963).
265. Eltbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966), citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1939).
266. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Court concludes that the impact upon the second interest is only "minimal,"' 267 "relatively small," 268 "only incidental," 269 "remote and conjectural," 2 70 or "uncertain." 271 First amendment interests "are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
272
the State may lawfully protect."
b. When No Opposed Interest Can Be Discerned. Occasional cases reach
the Supreme Court in which an obvious societal interest, such as the interest in first amendment values, takes preference because there is simply
no discoverable societal interest supporting the action of the government or
private party in opposition. 27 Thus, in 1971 the Supreme Court honored
the claims of an applicant for the bar based upon first amendment values,
when it could find "no legitimate state interest" that justified broad inquiries
into his beliefs and associations by a bar association committee. 274 Again,
when the Supreme Court concluded that a state had "no interest in limiting
275
it
its legislators' capacity to discuss their views of local or national policy,"
ruled that a state legislature could not refuse to seat a duly elected member
276
because of such utterances.
In 1976 Chief Justice Burger was willing to invalidate the disclosure provisions of the Election Campaign Act277 because, as he saw it, "no legitimate public interest has been shown in forcing the disclosure of modest
contributions that are the prime support of new, unpopular or unfashionable
political causes." 278 And, as the California Supreme Court noted: "If the
state curtails First Amendment freedoms to protect an interest that is
nonexistent, whether claimed on behalf of the government or on behalf of a
private individual, it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 279
c. When the Opposed Interest Is Insignificant. Judicial balancing of opposed societal interests in first amendment cases is accomplished most readily when the interest in opposition to the societal interest is insignificant or
unimportant. The United States Supreme Court, in 1939, invalidated an ordinance in effect prohibiting the distribution of literature on the sidewalks of
a city. It reasoned: "We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 52 (1961).
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397 (1950).
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
DeGregory v. New Hampshire Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 830 (1966).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971).
Boyd v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135 (1966).
Id.
2 U.S.C. § 431 (1970), as amended 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. V 1975).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 240 (1976) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 850, 434 P.2d 353, 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967).
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clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which
prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one
willing to receive it." 8 0 Justice Frankfurter could aptly remark twelve
years later: "The easiest cases have been those in which the only interest
opposing free communication was that of keeping the streets of the community clean. This could scarcely justify prohibiting the dissemination of infor' 28
mation by handbills or censoring their contents." '
Similarly, an interest in preventing "inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest" is simply not sufficient to justify depriving citizens of their liberty.
Justice Douglas spoke for a majority of the Court in 1949 when he said:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed, best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though
not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public in28 2
convenience, annoyance or unrest.
Two years later Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court, explained that
in many of the cases where the clear-and-present-danger or similar tests
were used and convictions for communicating were reversed, "the interest
which the State was attempting to protect was itself too insubstantial to war2 8s 3
rant restriction of speech."
Because to Justice Harlan "the federal interest in protecting the Nation
against pornography" was only "attenuated," he was ready to honor claims
based upon the first amendment, even when his colleagues ruled the materials obscene.2 8 4 When in 1964 the Supreme Court concluded that "the
State . . . has failed to show any appreciable public interest in preventing
the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan to recommend the lawyers it
selects to represent injured workers," 2 85 it refused to sustain limitations imposed upon a labor union that were deemed to infringe upon first amendment interests.

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951) (concurring).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957) (dissenting).
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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The United States Supreme Court has used a variety of adjectives to
describe the kind of societal interest that can be placed on the scales with,
and possibly outweigh, the interest of our society in freedom of communication. Frequently the Supreme Court has said that only a "compelling" interest may outweigh the interest in communication. 286 At other times the
Supreme Court has said that the societal interest in communication can only
be outweighed by an interest described as "substantial," ' 28 7 "subordinating," 288 "paramount," 2 89 "cogent," 2 90 "strong," 291 "weighty," 292 "important," 293 "sufficiently important," 294 "overriding," 95 or "significant." 296 In
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,2 97 the Court insisted upon a
showing of an "appreciable public interest." 298 A restriction on access to
the electoral process "can be sustained only if it furthers a 'vital' governmental interest," the Court declared in 1976.299 Only "the very strongest of state
interests" will justify restrictions upon expression, said Chief Justice Burger

286. DeGregory v. New Hampshire Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 265 (1957) ("Such a 'subordinating interest of the State must be compelling."')); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling."); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[W]e have said that state action impinging on a free speech and association will not be
sustained unless the governmental interest asserted to support such impingement is compelling."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972) ("It is established constitutional doctrine .. .that government may restrict First Amendment rights only if the restriction is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963) ("The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a 'compelling' state interest . . . can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.").
287. "[A] substantial governmental interest," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976); "an
important or substantial governmental interest," Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963); "[E]ven harmful conduct cannot
justify restrictions upon speech unless substantial interests of society are at stake." American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397 (1950); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940).
288. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
289. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
290. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
291. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963).
292. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976).
293. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564
(1965); "an important governmental interest," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
294. Id. at 25.
295. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
296. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
297. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
298. Id. at 8.
299. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94 (1976).
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in the same case. 30 0 "Colorable" state interests will not suffice to outweigh
301
nor will interests that are "too
the societal interest in communication,
' 30 2
"
remote and conjectural.
There have been some indications by various Justices that merely
"legitimate" interests may properly find a place on the scales with the preferred interest in communication, but this would be an improper balancing.
With four Justices dissenting, Chief Justice Burger in 1973 wrote for the
Court that "the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination
or exhibition of obscene material." 303 In a companion case he continued in
like vein, stating: "The States have a long-recognized legitimate interest in
[T]here are legitimate state
regulating the use of obscene material ....
interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity ....
[W]e hold that the States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in
Justice Brennan, however, has concluded that
"304
obscene material ..
the interest in suppressing obscenity is "essentially unfocused and illdefined," as well as "speculative," and as such is unworthy, of being balanced
against society's interest in communication. 30 5 In dissent he and Justice
Marshall properly stated that "merely 'legitimate' governmental interest
cannot override" claims based upon society's interest in communication. 30 6
In the same year the Supreme Court was willing to announce that "only
those interests of the highest order" will ever outweigh the interest in first
amendment values. 307 By 1976 the Court reported: "We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the soft
that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of
some legitimate governmental interest." 30 8 Although the judicial record is
not yet entirely clear, the better view is that one who advances another
interest in opposition to the interest in communication must show the "im30 9
portant," "significant," and "compelling" nature of the interest he asserts.

300. Id. at 245 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
302. DeCregory v. New Hampshire Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
303. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
304. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57, 69 (1973).
305. Id. at 109 (dissenting).
306. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972).
307. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
308. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
309. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"It is well-settled law that once it is determined that state action impinges on high-order
First Amendment rights . . . then the burden of proof is on the state to show that the governmental interests asserted to support the impingement are 'compelling.' " New Left Educ.
Project v. Board of Regents, 326 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam; mem.);
accord, Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968).
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d. Preferencefor Interests Enshrined in the Constitution. There is some
evidence that in a close case the Supreme Court gives preference to societal
interests which have been deliberately enshrined in the Constitution over
other interests which the Court accepts as significant. First amendment values are often referred to by the Supreme Court as the "preferred" freedoms, 310 and one reason given is that these interests were specifically incorporated into the Constitution by the founding fathers. Chief Justice Stone
once explained:
The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil
liberties and the specificity of their command where freedom of
speech and of religion are concerned require some accommodation
of the powers which government normally exercises, when no
question of civil liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand
that those liberties be protected against the action of government
itself.3 1 '
Although the Court has readily acknowledged that a state had a legitimate
interest in the preservation of peace and good order, it has nevertheless
preferred the societal interests represented by the first amendment. The
Court explained its balancing task in these words:
We must determine whether the alleged protection of the State's
interest, means to which end would, in the absence of limitation
by the Federal Constitution, lie wholly within the State's discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has
come into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by
312
the Federal compact.
Occasionally, however, there has been a down-grading of claims and interests
by the Supreme Court because they were not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution. When freedom of contract was urged upon the Court to invalidate a minimum wage law, the tribunal rejected the argument, remarking:
"The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract." 31 3 Although the
Court is certainly justified in manifesting its own respect for the enduring
values of our society specifically incorporated into our organic law, it should
not fail to give full weight to a contemporary societal interest, such as
penumbral interests in privacy or association, simply because they were not
expressed openly in the Constitution by the generation that ratified the basic
law.

310.
311.
312.
313.

See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953).
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1940) (dissenting).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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e. The Availability of Alternatives. The United States Supreme Court
will, in effect, prefer one societal interest over another when there are
reasonable alternatives available to the government or private party which
would protect the second interest with less impact upon the former interest.314 This is especially so where legislation designed to safeguard some
other interest impacts upon the societal interest in communication. 3 15 Justice Stewart, speaking for the Supreme Court in 1960, reported:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the
light of
31 6
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
The government or party advancing interests opposed to first amendment
values must prove that there exists no reasonable alternative that would protect the opposed interest with fewer negative effects on the interest in
communication. 317 It would be incumbent upon the government, said the
Supreme Court in 1963, "to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights." 3 1 8 Nor is it only where first amendment interests are being restricted that the reasonable alternative requirement is relevant. Justice
Frankfurter aptly remarked: "Whenever the reasonableness and fairness of a
measure are at issue-as they-are in every case in which this Court must
apply the standards of reason and fairness . . .- the availability or unavaila319
bility of alternative methods of proceeding is germane."
At times the Supreme Court has, in contrast, given preference to the
interest opposed to communication when the parties asserting first amendment values had readily available to them equally effective methods of
communication which would not have so imperiled the opposing interest. In
1972 the Supreme Court held that the interest in property justified the
owner of a shopping center in banning Vietnam war protesters from the
premises. 320 The Court reached this decision in part because the literature
could have easily been distributed on adjacent sidewalks and streets: "It
314. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951).
315. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
316. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
317. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (Brennan, White, & .Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
318. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
319. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 493 (1960) (dissenting).
320. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to
yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist." 3 21 The same year,
in sustaining governmental action excluding from the country one Mandel
under the broad authority conferred upon the Attorney General, the Court
refused to balance rights assertedly opposed but added that if it had to,
"alternative means of access to Mandel's ideas might be a relevant factor
were we called upon to balance First Amendment rights against government
regulatory interests." 322 Two years later the Supreme Court sustained a
prison regulation banning face-to-face interviews between media representatives dnd designated prisoners, largely because alternative means of communication between the prisoners and the outer world existed and the Court
deemed them adequate. 323 The prison regulation, said the Court, "must be
viewed in the light of the alternative means of communication permitted
3
under the regulations with persons outside the prison." 24
Customarily, however, the Supreme Court has not subordinated the
societal interest in communication because some other less annoying form of
expression would have been available to the citizen. 325 In setting aside the
refusal of municipal authorities to permit the rock musical "Hair" to play in
a municipal theater open generally to other productions, Justice Blackmun,
speaking for the Court, said: "Whether petitioner might have used some
other, privately owned, theater in the city for the production is of no consequence .... Even if a privately owned forum had been available, that fact
alone would not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint." 326 If
the reasonable alternative requirement is to be applied to persons asserting
first amendment interests, there should be a heavy burden upon the government or private party advancing an opposed interest to prove that feasible, inexpensive, and effective alternative means of communication are readily available under the circumstances. Joining in an opinion which, based on
the particular facts, gave preference to an interest opposed to communication, Justice Harlan took pains to indicate clearly that he would hold otherwise if no alternative means existed for "reaching a significant audience"
3 27
with whom the citizen desired to communicate.

321. Id. at 567.
322. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
323. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
324. id. at 823.
325. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
326. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975).
327. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (concurring).
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C. Use of Prior Balancing
1. Common Law and Precedents
The English common law existing at the time of our separation is only
infrequently a useful guide to a Supreme Court currently balancing societal
interests in constitutional adjudication. Many particulars of the Constitution,
such as the ban upon an establishment of religion, were intended to be a
rejection of practices found acceptable in England. For example, twelve of
the original thirteen colonies rejected the English rule denying counsel to an
accused in grave cases. 328 In 1941 the Supreme Court observed: "To assume that English common law in this field became ours is to deny the
generally accepted historical belief that 'one of the objects of the Revolution
was to get rid of the English common law on libbrty of speech and of the
press.' ' ' 329 Twenty-one years later, in another first amendment case, the
Supreme Court again affirmed that we have "rejected the idea that the interests were to be accommodated by applying the common law of England
at the time the Constitution was adopted." 330 The doctrine justifying recourse to the common law, said the Supreme Court in 1936, "is subject to
the qualifications that the common-law rule invoked shall be one not rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their civil and political conditions." 3 3'
Justice Black, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, warned in 1958 against constitutional construction with heavy reliance
upon the common law:
Those who formed the Constitution struck out anew free of previous shackles in an effort to obtain a better order of government
more congenial to human liberty and welfare. It cannot be seriously claimed that they intended to adopt the common law
wholesale. They accepted those portions of it which were adapted
to this country and conformed to the ideals of its citizens and rejected the remainder. In truth there was widespread hostility to
the common law in general and profound opposition to its adoption
into our jurisprudence from the commencement of the Revolutionary War until long after the Constitution was ratified. 332
In currently balancing societal interests in constitutional adjudication, the
United States Supreme Court has been more willing to make reference to
328. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
329. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941).
330. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384 & n.5 (1962). The occasional case involving due
process of law in civil procedure has been a noticeable exception, often being resolved in part
by reference to the English law at the time of the Revolution. See, e.g., Ownbey v. Morgafi,

256 U.S. 94 (1921).
331. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936).
332. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 212 (1958) (dissenting).
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the common law in America, either as it existed at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution or at the time of a later amendment and as it developed
thereafter. Speaking for the Court in 1905, Justice Brewer stated: "One
other fact must be borne in mind, and that is that in interpreting the Constitution we must have recourse to the common law." 333 Justice Sutherland
was speaking for the Court in 1934 when he stated that the seventh amendment guaranty of trial by jury in civil cases is to be construed according to
"the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules
existed in 1791." 334 In decisions involving private as well as public law,
American common law, especially if of long duration and current vitality,
can indicate to a court concerned with constitutional adjudication how the
clashing societal interests should be adjusted. The common law development
in tort law of privacy interests, at the expense of other societal interests,3 3 5
has clearly influenced the Supreme Court in concluding that this interest
was not only deserving of constitutional protection but would, in defined
circumstances, often outweigh other important interests of the community.3

36

A good deal of eighteenth century common law, however, represents
values long since repudiated, and the Supreme Court has indicated very
clearly that practices acceptable to the community in 1789 or 1791 are less
than appropriate guides to an acceptable balancing of societal interests in
contemporary America. For instance, the notion that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the eighth amendment should be construed according
to common law practices at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights has
been conclusively repudiated. 3 7 In defining grants of power to the federal
government, the common law has been virtually disregarded. 338 The common law has thus been a poor guide in balancing first amendment interests
339
against others.
In utilizing either English or American common law materials, a court in
constitutional adjudication must be very sure that the values represented by
the old cases continue to reflect the societal interests of contemporary
America and that the community desires them to be balanced as in the past.
Justice Moody commented on construction according to the common law in

333. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905).
334. )irnick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935).
335. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REx'. 193 (1890).
336. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
337. Forman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
338. Continental I1l. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669
(1935).
339. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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1908: "If that were so the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth
century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a
straightjacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment." 340 To
construe the Constitution solely by reference to the common law, in the
language of Justice Mathews, "would be to deny every quality of the law but
its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." 341 Even
Justice Harlan, who was ordinarily quite willing to employ historical materials in constitutional adjudication, cautioned: "It is, of course, true that history should not imprison those broad guarantees of the Constitution whose
proper scope is to be determined in a given instance by a blend of historical
understanding and the adaptation of purpose to contemporary circumstances."342
Courts concerned with constitutional adjudication can detect the relative
weights to be accorded societal interests and discover some clues to their
acceptable adjustment by reference to precedents which have not been repudiated by constitutional amendment, overruled by the Supreme Court, or
rejected by later legislation. "[I]n the main," said Justice Cardozo, "there
shall be adherence to precedent." 34 3 However, a group of precedents have
beep consciously repudiated by constitutional amendment because the' balanced interests with utterly inappropriate results. 344 For the same reason,
the Court has overruled a long list of its precedents 345 that were either
wrongly decided at the time or which no longer represent an acceptable
adjustment of the competing societal interests. 346 Because older precedents, not recently reaffirmed, may represent abnormalities occasioned by
crisis 347 or simply mirror adjustments acceptable to past generations but
long since passe, courts in balancing competing societal interests must be
ver' cautious in the extent to which they permit themselves to be influenced by- early precedents. Judicial decisions are social experiments and,
like experiments generally, many of them do not work and are to be rejected as soon as the erroneous balancing becomes apparent.3 48

340. Twining x. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908).
341. Hurtado N. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
342. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 124-25 (19701.
343. B. CARuozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921).
344. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). repudiated b% the
fourteenth amendment.
345. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUt.
L. REv. 735, 756-58 (1949).
346. Id. at 735-55.
347. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). But see id. at 233 (Murph%, J., dissenting).
348. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), rervd, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963):
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), rev'd, West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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2. Legislative Balancing
The United States Supreme Court has in most areas given considerable
deference to the judgment of legislative bodies that have indicated how
clashing societal interests are to be balanced in particular situations. 34 9 In
1944 Justice Frankfurter described the Court's traditional reticence to challenge congressional determinations:
As society becomes more and more complicated and individual experience correspondingly narrower, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the experience and beliefs expressed by those
entrusted with the duty of legislating emerge as the decisive factors in constitutional adjudication. 350
Seven years later Justice Frankfurter reiterated the propriety of deference to
legislative judgments: "How best to reconcile competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike is not a judgment to be
displaced by ours, but to be respected unless outside the pale of fair judg35 1
ment."
Justice Harlan was in full accord that ordinarily in constitutional adjudication previous legislative balancing of societal interests was to be respected.
He wrote in 1967:
It is well settled that the Court must give the widest deference to
legislative judgments that concern the character and urgency of the
problems with which the State is confronted. Legislatures are, as
this Court has often acknowledged, the "main guardian" of the
public interest, and, within their constitutional competence, their
understanding of that interest must be accepted as "well-nigh"
conclusive. 352
Both of these jurists, however, understood thoroughly that in many cases of
constitutional construction there has been no previous legislative weighing of
the competing interests of society. Moreover, they accepted the proposition
that when important values or interests are at stake and the legislative
judgment is outrageously improper for our larger society, judicial weighing
of the competing interests reaching a different balance of the opposed
353
societal interests is both invited and required.
349. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
350. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, in OF LAW AND MEN 174 (P. Elman ed., 1956).
351. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (concurring).
352. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ., concurring without
opinion); Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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There are literally dozens of illustrations of judicial respect for legislative
judgments when the courts are called upon to balance societal interests in
constitutional controversies. A few examples suffice. When in 1972 the Supreme Court ruled that there was to be no constitutional privilege of a
newsman to refuse to answer the questions of a grand jury attempting to
deal with crime, it made reference to the fact that neither the federal Congress nor legislatures in a majority of the states had enacted legislation creating such a privilege. 354 Again, in holding violative of equal protection the
Ohio laws whose onerous requirements made it virtually impossible for third
party candidates to get on the ballot, including one that necessitated that a
new party produce signatures of fifteen percent of those who voted in the
last gubernatorial election, the Supreme Court was impressed with the fact
that forty-two states required signatures from only one percent or fewer of
355
the voters.
Where the Congress of the United States has constitutionally delegated
rulemaking poNVer to the federal administrative agencies, the Supreme
Court, in balancing societal interests, has indicated its willingness to be
guided by administrative regulations promulgated within the congressional
grant and approved, even implicitly, by the Congress. To illustrate, in
balancing the interests represented by those who sought access to the
broadcast media against the other interests represented by station owners
and national systems, the Supreme Court respected the judgment of the.
Federal Communications Commission, as authorized by the Congress, that
the "fairness doctrine" governed broadcasting and that, beyond this, there
was generally to be no constitutional right of access to the media even for
356
discussion of political matters.
Although the Supreme Court at times has shown respect in constitutional
adjudication to a previous balancing by a state legislature of the societal
interests concerned, even when it was restricting first amendment freedoms, 357 the essence of our federal society would not be dishonored if the
Supreme Court, in weighing and balancing societal interests, gave a smaller
quantum of respect to judgments of state legislatures than it does to Congress. As the ultimate arbiter of our federalism, the Court must frequently
tell the states that they have improperly magnified state interests at the
expense of national societal interests. The commerce clause area abounds
with instances where the weighing by state legislatures inadequately appreciated the interests of the larger society, and state legislation had to be
invalidated as unconstitutional by the high court. 358 At times, too, the Sup354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972).
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1968).
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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reme Court has seen the societal interest in communication as being of national scope, requiring the invalidation of legislation based on state interests
which were pushed too far at the expense of the national interest. Recall the
language of Justice Roberts speaking for the Court and describing that tribunal's task: "We must determine," he wrote, "whether the alleged protection of the State's interests . . .has been pressed, in this instance, to a point
where it has come into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected
by the federal compact." 3 59 Until such time as the state legislatures can be
schooled to identify and weigh adequately the national interests of our society, especially in areas of freedom of communication, the Supreme Court
will be justified in according a modest measure of respect to state legislation
restrictive of either first amendment values or the national interest in a free
flow of interstate commerce.
As the Supreme Court performs its responsibility of balancing the
societal interests of the nation, it may well be justified in giving the
minimum quantum of respect to previous balancing by the typical small,
unicameral legislatures of local governments. Here the pressure of the
parochial and the chauvinistic is at its greatest, and professional help to the
legislator at the minimum, so that the resulting legislation all too frequently
disregards or neglects the larger and more important interests of our society.
Literally hundreds of local ordinances have been voided as unconstitutional
by the Supreme' Court because of faulty balancing of the affected societal
interests, and, as the number increases yearly, it is understandable if the
respect by the Court for the previous legislative judgment decreases proportionately. Whatever respect is given to previous legislative judgments, in
our society the role of consciously and skillfully balancing the opposed
societal interests in constitutional controversies is that of the Supreme
Court, and it can be abdicated to no other body.
3. The Use of Presumptions and the Placement of Burdens
When the Congress of the United States has previously identified and
weighed the opposing societal interests, respect by the courts for the legislative balancing of such interests is often manifested by a presumption that the
legislation is constitutional. 360 However, where the congressional legislation
impacts upon the societal interest in freedom of communication, there will
36
be no such presumption. 1
The Supreme Court at times has accorded a presumption of validity
under the Constitution to products of state legislatures, 3 62 but it is very
359.
360.
361.
362.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938).
O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931).
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unlikely that it will confer such a presumption upon state laws interfering
with an interest of the broader, national society. At least since 1945, for
example, it has been established that "the usual presumption supporting
legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the
great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment." a63 The year before, Justice Murphy had suggested that "the human
freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the
Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any
attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid."364 Nor will
the Court confer the presumption on state laws interfering with interstate
commerce.
It is by now well established that, in the balancing of societal interests,
the Supreme Court will entertain a strong presumption that any prior restraint upon first amendment values will be unconstitutional whether the
legislation is enacted by the Congress, state legislatures, or municipal councils. Prior decisions 3 65 abundantly supported the 1968 statement of the
Court "that '[a] system of prior restraints comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' "366
Just as the balancing of societal interests can be aided by the use of
presumptions, so too the placement of burdens by the Court will contribute
to the success of the weighing and balancing by a judicial tribunal charged
with constitutional adjudication. In balancing first amendment interests
against other interests, the Supreme Court and other tribunals properly
place upon the government or the private party advancing the opposed interest the burden of showing that it outweighs the very important interest in
freedom of communication and that no alternatives are available to protect
the opposed interest with less of an impact upon communication. 367 The
government, when advancing an opposing interest, must show "a controlling
justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to
associate." 368 Five years later the Court added that it will "plainly be incumbent" upon those advancing opposed interests to demonstrate that no

363. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
364. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 173 (1944) (dissenting).
365. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
366. Carroll v. Commissioners of Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), citing Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 90 (1963), and Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57
(1965); accord, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
367. "When governmental activity collides with First Amendment rights, the Government
has the burden of establishing that its interests are legitimate and compelling and that the
incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights is no greater than is essential to vindicate
its subordinating interests." Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972).
368. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
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alternative forms exist that would reasonably protect those interests with less
of an impact upon communication. 369
In 1972 in a case involving the societal interest in first amendment associational values, the Supreme Court ruled that when a college refused to
recognize a student group, "the burden was upon the college administration
to justify its decision of rejection." 3 70 It added: "While a college has a
legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action." 371 When the Supreme Court invalidated a state
law requiring an applicant for a tax exemption to bear the burden of showing
it was not engaged in unlawful advocacy of governmental overthrow by
force, the Court stated: "Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires in the circumstances of this case that
the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged
in criminal speech." 37 2 In 1971 the Supreme Court added generally:
"When a State seeks to inquire about an individual's beliefs and associations
a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a
legitimate state interest." 373 The Supreme Court's recognition of the very
important societal interest in freedom of communication results in the rule
that a citizen subjected to legislation allegedly protective of opposed interests but void for overbreadth "does not have to sustain the burden of
demonstrating that the State could not constitutionally have written a different and specific statute covering his activities as disclosed by the charge and
the evidence introduced against him." 374
The creation of presumptions and the placement of burdens, as indicated
above, is a desirable and proper part of the task of weighing competing
societal interests. The Court must continue to add presumptions and burdens in favor of those interests it recognizes as most important.
4. State Court Resolutions
Although, as noted earlier, there are certain areas in which state and
local legislative bodies have been inclined to prefer local interests at the
expense of national societal values, the Supreme Court is fortunate in having
available over fifty laboratories to which it can look to see how segments of

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972).
Id.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
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our society desire interests balanced. More importantly, the Court can judge
the effects on society of the balance of interests struck in state courts.
In most areas of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has been willing
to look to the standards, practices, and experiences of the states and the
District of Columbia to ascertain how they weigh certain values and how
such segments of our larger society feel clashing societal values should be
adjusted within the constitutional framework. In 1952, for example, the
Court was willing to deny first amendment protection to defamation after
discovering that "every American jurisdiction" had held constitutional
punishment for libels directed at individuals. 375 Five years later, when the
Court discovered that the laws of all American states outlawed "obscene"
materials, it held that the societal interest in protecting public morality in
effect outweighed the societal interest in communication. 3 76 In 1964, in
defining the circumstances under which victims of defamation who were
public officials could recover from the press, the Supreme Court placed considerable reliance upon the reasoning and language of the Kansas court
3 77
which, it noted, had been adopted by a number of other state courts.
Again, when charged with balancing societal interests in communication and
the administration of justice, the Supreme Court in 1972 noted the fact that
a majority of the states had not by legislation or judicial ruling created a
newsman's privilege, and the Court accepted as proper such balancing by
the states. 3 78 Finally, in passing upon the Virginia statute prohibiting
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs, the Supreme
Court was guided by the fact that a number of state courts had ruled that
the societal interest in communication was to be preferred and that the result of such rulings did not imperil any other important interest of soci3 79
ety.
However, there is always the danger that state laws enacted many years
earlier and state judicial holdings of some time past represent only values of
another generation. Professor Kadish has remarked that "[s]urely, the decisions of a group of legislators and judges are not an accurate measure of the
judgment of society; first, they are a selected group, and second, there may
well be a time lag between the decision of the people and its implementation in law." 380 Reference by the Court to the practices and experiences of

375. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952).
376. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
377. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
378. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
379. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
380. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 344 (1957).
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the states can produce rulings utterly unsuited to the interests of our contemporary society. In utilizing state constitutional provisions, statutes, practices, and judicial holdings, the Supreme Court must exercise extreme caution that the values thereby protected are both national and current.
5. Other Law Cultures
When the nations of the world generally acknowledge a particular
societal interest and agree on how it should be balanced against opposing
interests in particular cases, the Supreme Court may be guided in its balanc38
ing by such consensus. Whether balancing a public interest in obscenity '
or in the death penalty,3 82 the Court has often looked to "what dozens of
other countries" have done. Especially where the common law countries are
in general accord in balancing societal interests, they have influenced the
Court and other tribunals in their task of balancing interests in constitutional
adjudication.38 3 We have looked most readily at the practices, experiences,
3 4
solutions, and effects in Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries. 8
To illustrate, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that
claims of executive privilege were not beyond review, pointing out that "indeed, no common law country follows the rule, urged by the President in
this case, that mere executive assertions of privilege are conclusive on the
38 6
courts." 38 5 The Supreme Court affirmed.
The law of nations and the jus belli, or law of war, frequently represent
the judgment of most nations on how societal interests are to be balanced in
particular cases, and the Supreme Court has agreed that these laws are to be
38 7
followed by American courts in resolving constitutional controversies.
Admittedly, no two cultures have the same hierarchy of societal values, but
the same conflicts arise in many countries year after year, and both the bar
and the courts must be encouraged to investigate how comparable societies
are resolving clashes of interest similar to those present in the United
States, with a particular view toward discovering the effect upon the society
of preferring one societal interest to another in given circumstances.

381. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
382. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
383. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
384. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). But see id. at 174 (Black, J., concurring);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
More than any of his colleagues, Justice Frankfurter was willing to review England's balance of competing interests to give direction to the Court on resolving the clash of similar
societal concerns. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
385. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 714 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
386. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
387. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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D. Considerationof the Impact of a Ruling on Society
In constitutional adjudication the jurisprudence of interests, like all forms
of sociological jurisprudence, requires the jurist to consider the utility of the
rule contemplated with full consideration of the impact and effect of the
norm upon his society. Professor Richard Wasserstrom has ably noted that
"restricted utilitarianism performs the practical function of forcing concentration upon the kinds of consequences that should always be taken into ac338
count and that all too often are apt to be neglected."
Some Supreme Court Justices have long understood the obligation of the
Court to fully explore the utility and effects of all possible rulings within a
given case. As early as 1881, Justice Holmes stressed that a court must always consider "what is expedient for the community concerned." 3 9 In
1897 he urged that judges must "recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage." 39 0 In deciding whether to overrule precedents,
Chief Justice Stone said in 1944 that the Justices must "make certain that
more harm will not be done in rejecting than in retaining a rule of even
dubious validity." 39
'
There is evidence going back at least one hundred years that the Justices
of the Supreme Court have regularly-and properly-considered the impact
upon our society of possible rulings in a particular case. In 1871 the Court
explained why it was sustaining congressional power to issue paper currency
and make it legal tender: "It is also clear that if we hold the acts invalid as
applicable to debts incurred, or transactions which have taken place since
their enactment, our decision must cause, throughout the country, great
3 92
business derangement, widespread distress, and the rankest injustice."
Cases involving communication illustrate well the willingness of the
Court to consider the impact of its rulings upon the community. The Supreme Court in 1960 voided an ordinance forbidding the circulation of
anonymous handbills because it had "no doubt that such an identification
requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and
thereby freedom of expression." 3 93 Justice Harlan spoke for the Court in
emphasizing that compelled disclosure of NAACP membership in Alabama
would expose the members "to economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility," 394

388.
389.
390.
391.
ing).
392.
393.
394.

R. WAssEasTnOm, THE JutDICAL DECISION 135-36 (1961).
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881).
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 580 (1944) (dissentLegal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 529 (1871).
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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resulting in an intolerable loss of protection to first amendment interests.
When the Supreme Court voided a federal requirement that an addressee of
mail must notify in writing the Postmaster General if he wanted "communist
political propaganda" delivered to him, the Court explained:
This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects those who have sensitive positions. Their livelihood maybe dependent on a security clearance. Public officials,
like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they would
invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says contains the seeds of treason. 395
When, in 1972, the Court held that the interest in the fair and effective
administration of criminal justice required that newsmen, like other citizens,
respond to grand jury subpoenas and questions, it noted that "the evidence
fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow
of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen." 396 Particularly in cases involving freedom of expression, the Court has been quick
to respond when decisions adverse to such interests result in a "chilling
effect" on their exercise. 397 In voiding overly broad statutes impinging
upon communication, the Supreme Court explained that the decisions were
necessary because "all society, and not merely ... those exercising their
rights, might be the loser" if such inroads upon first amendment values were
398
allowed to stand.
Capable scholars concur that it is essential for the Supreme Court and
other tribunals to consider carefully the impact of constitutional rulings on
our society. Miller and Howell take perhaps the most extreme position, stating that "judicial decisions should be gauged by their results and not by
either their coincidence with a set.of allegedly consistent doctrinal principles
or by an impossible reference to neutrality of principle." 399 Professor
Kadish would probably accept this statement, for he emphasized that ultimately every constitutional judgment "entails a prediction of consequences." 4 0°
Not every legal scholar, however, agrees fully with this
placement of emphasis on result. Although Professor Wechsler accepted the
importance of weighing each decision according to its potential "contribution
395. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
396. Branzbnrg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972).

397. E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
398. Id. at 486.
399. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. Ci. L.
REV. 660, 690-91 (1960).

4(X). Kadish, supra note 380, at 353; see Pollak, ConstitutionalAdjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, 11 J. PUB. L. 48, 61 (1962).
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to the quality of our society," he also stressed that "[i]t is not enough that a
'04 1
decision makes such a contribution unless it rests on neutral principles. "
E. The Community Conscience and Consensus
Weighing and balancing societal interests in constitutional adjudication
regularly requires recourse to the collective conscience and consensus of the
community. Benjamin Cardozo wrote in 1921 that a judge is "under a duty
to conform to the accepted standards of the community, the mores of the
times." 40 2 Seven years later he wrote that the judiciary in measuring and
balancing interests must look "to the experience and sentiments and moral
and economic judgments of the community."'403 Speaking for the Supreme
Court, Justice Cardozo wrote that "the conscience of mankind" must be con40 4
sulted to determine if particular rights or interests are to be honored.
Justice Frankfurter also stressed the need for the courts in constitutional
adjudication to seek out and honor the moral sense of the society and the
community conscience. Rights and interests to be preferred, he wrote in
1950, must be "based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
society as conceived by our whole history." 40 5 He added that "the Court
enforces those permanent and pervasive feelings of our society as to which
there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social
institutions." 406 Four years later Justice Frankfurter wrote that "the whole
training and proved performance [of Supreme Court Justices] substantially
insure that their conclusions reflect understanding of, and due regard for,
law as the expression of the views and feelings that may fairly be deemed
representative of the community as a continuing society." 40 7 Professor Braden tells us that Justice Frankfurter decided cases "only on the basis of the
consensus of society's opinion of what are fundamental standards of fair play
40 8
and justice."
The Supreme Court has long seen its task as necessitating the adjustment
of societal interests so as to prefer claims based upon "those fundamental
401. Wechsler, Toward Nentral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 27
(1959).
402. B. CARDozo, supra note 343, at 108.
403. B. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 72-75 (1928).
404. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937): accord, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934).
405. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (dissenting).
406. Id.
407. Frankfurter, The Job of a Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1954, § 6
(niagazine), at 14. 408. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571,
582-89 (1948).
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principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions." 40 9 Fifty years later the Court stated that "the conscience of our people" must be consulted in resolving constitutional controversies. 410 More recently, Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan again emphasized that "the collective conscience of
41
our people" must be ascertained in adjudicating constitutional disputes. '
Methods that "shock the conscience" or "'offend a sense of justice" will not
be allowed under the Supreme Court's guardianship of constitutional val4 12
ues.
A court in balancing societal interests can properly consult "the pervasive
feelings of our society," 41 3 as well as "contemporary community standards." 4 14 Justices at times have expressed their fears that their colleagues
will confuse their own values with the community consensus, 415 but capable
craftsmen on the bench fully appreciate that it is the society and community
consensus that control how interests are to be balanced in constitutional controversies. Justice Frankfurter once said that construction of the due process
clause "involves the application of standards of fairness and justice very
broadly conceived," adding: "They are not the application of merely personal
standards but the impersonal standards of society which alone judges, as the
organs of Law, are empowered to enforce." 416 Justices are not to impose
personal notions, according to Justice Frankfurter, but rather "that consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard
enjoined by the Constitution." 4 17 On another occasion Justice Frankfurter
wrote of the broad clauses in the Constitution:
In enforcing them this Court does not translate personal views into
constitutional limitations. In applying such a large, untechnical
concept as "due process," the Court enforces those permanent and
pervasive feelings of our society as to which there is compelling
evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions." 418
409. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 102 (1908); accord, Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
410. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
411. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concurring).
412. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
413. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
414. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
415. Interesting in this regard is the perceptive observatiou by Justice Harlan that
""[sipecific' provisions of the Constitution, no less than 'due process,' lend themselves as readily to 'personal' interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the
Constitution in supposed 'tune with the times.'" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501
(1965) (concurring).
416. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (concurring).
417. Id. at 471.
418. Solesbee x. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (dissenting).
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Application of contemporary community standards is relevant in first
amendment situations, as elsewhere. In determining which kinds of erotic
materials are to be given protection of that amendment in opposition to the
societal interest in public morality, the Court has indicated that "contemporary community standards" govern, 4 19 and that publications and films will be
protected unless "the material goes substantially beyond customary limits of
4 20
candor."
The moral sense of the community is ascertainable by sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and other social scientists conversant with
the means for discovering how the community desires clashes of societal
interests to be resolved,4 2 1 and the level of performance of both the bar and
the bench will be significantly elevated when the profession perfects its
handling of these materials.
F. The Relevance of Quantitative Considerations
When a court in constitutional adjudication tentatively concludes that the
opposed societal interests are of roughly comparable value, it can permissibly explore quantitative considerations, endeavoring to ascertain the number
of persons who would be advantaged by the preference of one interest compared to the number who might gain if the opposed interest were honored.
Implicitly, quantitative cojisiderations have influenced the resolution of constitutional controversies in many areas. Long ago the courts, in effect, held
that in condemnation proceedings, the private property interests of an individual would be subordinated, under the eminent domain power of the
4 22
sovereign, when necessary to protect the common weal.
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 423 is a deliberate
recognition that the interests of the larger society, when protected by action
within the constitutional competence of the federal government, are to prevail over interests advanced by the states and their local governments. Dozens of commerce clause decisions illustrate this.4 2 4 When the Supreme
Court in 1974 held that the federal civil rights laws forbade denying 2,856
non-English speaking students of Chinese ancestry a meaningful opportunity
to participate in the public school educational program, Justice Blackmun
wrote in his concurring opinion, with the agreement of the Chief Justice:
425
"For me, numbers are at the heart of this case .....
419. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
420. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
421. Cohen, Robson & Bates, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Community, 8 J. LEGAL
ED. 137 (1955).
422. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
423. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
424. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896).
425. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 572 (1974) (concurring),
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Notwithstanding the incorporation of particular interests in the Constitution and the existence of the supremacy clause, it should be expected that at
times the numbers affected by legislation enacted by a state for the protection of a substantial and important interest will be much greater than the
numbers claiming protection under either federal constitutional or legislative
provisions. This situation might justify a court, in constitutional adjudication,
in sustaining the societal interest advanced by the state or local community. 426
G. The Utility of Formulas
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other tribunal concerned with constitutional adjudication has produced a formula that will
eliminate the case-by-case weighing and balancing of societal interests in
particular litigation, and it is almost certain that no verbalization of formula
or test can significantly help the courts in their basic task. Although Justice
Holmes was concerned with the societal interest in property in his opinion
in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,4 27 his observations are equally
applicable to all societal interests deserving of constitutional protection.
The limits set to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of the State.
The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be
determined by any general formula in advance, but points in the
line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions42that
this or
8
that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.
Chief Justice Hughes, nearly twenty years later, concurred in this observation adding that the protection of individual rights required both an "appreciation of social conditions and a true appraisal of the actual effect of
29
conduct." 4
It "inheres in the very nature of the judicial enforcement of the Due
Process Clause," said Justice Frankfurter, that balancing will be done on a
case-by-case basis. He continued:
We cannot escape such instance-by-instance, case-by-case application of that clause in all the varieties of situations that come before
this Court. It would be comfortable if, by a comprehensive formula, we could decide when a confession is coerced so as to vitiate a
state conviction. There is no such talismanic formula. Every term
we have to examine the particular circumstances of a particular
426. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
427. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
428. Id. at 355.
429. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 165-66 (1928).
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case in order to apply generalities which on one disputes.... It is
needless to multiply instances. It is the nature of the concept of
due process, and, 'I venture to believe, its high serviceability in
our constitutional system, that the judicial enforcement of the Due
Process Clause is the very antithesis of a Procrustean rule....
The task is onerous and exacting, demanding as it does the utmost
discipline in objectivity, the severest control of personal predilections. But it cannot be escaped, not even by disavowing that such
43 0
is the nature of our task.
Justice Frankfurter's observations are equally valid when any broad concept
4 31
in the Constitution is to be construed.
When a formula is invoked, its effect on important interests can be devastating. Chief Judge Learned Hand, in Dennis v. United States, 4 32 concocted a standard unjustifiably weighted against the societal interest in
communication. He wrote: "In each case [the courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 433 It was a sad day when
this standard was adopted by the Supreme Court, 434 but fortunately it has
quietly disappeared upon subsequent reflection. Implicit in its very expression was the notion that if some societal interest were to be sacrificed, it
would be the one deliberately enshrined by the founding fathers in the Constituton. Comparably deficient, for the same reason, is the statement by
Chief Justice Warren in United States v. O'Brien 4 35 that, at least wh6n
"speech" and "non-speech" elements are employed by a citizen,
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
436
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Other so-called tests, such as those permitting incarceration of citizens
when they incite to riot, 4 3 7 distribute obscene literature, 438 or abuse their
430. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 696-97 (1959).
431. For example, Judge Kaufman, speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized similar difficulties in the constitutional adjudication of first amendment rights. James
v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1972).
432. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
433. Id. at 212.
434. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
435. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
436. Id. at 377.
437. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
438. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Note the dissents of Justices Brennan,
Douglas, Marshall and Stewart in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.'49, 70 (1973).
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freedom 439 are so hopelessly vague as to discourage communication, to the
ultimate loss of the community. To deprive citizens of their freedom under
standards devoid of any real guidance is simply an abuse of political power.
Too much was perhaps expected of the "clear and present danger" guide,
and it, too, was deficient in its acceptance of the proposition that the societal
interest in freedom of communication was to be sacrificed at the altar of any
other "substantive" interest. It has contributed, however, to the judicial
balancing of opposed societal interests by its legitimate insistence that conduct manifesting one important interest is not to be punished unless it immediately and significantly imperils the opposed interest.

H. The Role of Rules and Doctrines
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties with set formulas, however, to
adjudicate constitutional controversies purely on an ad hoc basis would be a
never-ending task for the Supreme Court. Even more significantly, it would
result in the incarceration of citizens who had been provided with no
reasonable guides, for instance to permissible expression and communication, unless the newly announced rule or doctrine were to be applied prospectively only. Thus, some compromise is essential.
Even as he insisted upon the need for case-by-case adjudication in constitutional law, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged and endorsed the previous
activity of the high court in announcing the rule that coerced confessions
could not be used to convict.440 Justice Powell, who has been generally
receptive to utilizing the methods of a jurisprudence of interests in constitutional controversies, 4 4 ' has complained that "an ad hoc resolution of the
competing interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible. " ' 2 The
task of the Court, he urged, is the formulation of general rules that reflect a
prudential weighing and balancing of the societal interests in repetitive situ3
ations.4
In weighing and balancing opposed societal interests in constitutional
controversies, it is possible for the Supreme Court to adopt general rules
expressed originally by the Congress or other legislative bodies, or to create
their own rules and doctrines giving greater guidance to the citizenry and
the lower courts. For one example, when .Congress had concluded that the
interest in state security and the life of the President outweighed any interest in communication expressed in the form of a threat upon the life of
439. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). But see id. at 672 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
dissenting).
440. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 696 (1959).
441. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (concurring).
442. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
443. Id. at 343-44.
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the Chief Executive, the Court readily agreed with such a balancing of interests. 4
In our society it is the prime obligation of the legislatures to weigh and
balance the opposed societal interests and to announce rules and doctrines
which reflect prudential balances. We demand too much of the Supreme
Court when we expect it alone to perform tasks that can and should be done
by legislative bodies. Legislatures at all levels must become more vigorous
and responsible in recognizing the values of our society and balancing them
in ways more reasonable, more just, and more acceptable to the larger
community.
Once the Supreme Court has announced a rule or doctrine, or given its
approval to a legislative reconciliation of competing interests, it should not
be expected to police the operation of the rule in practice by making continuous, individual assessments of social utility and balances of the opposed
societal interests in a continuum of cases. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "It is
important to bear in mind that this Court can only hope to set limits and
point the way. It falls to the lot of legislative bodies and administrative officials to find practical solutions within the frame of our decisions." 44s It is
utterly inappropriate and unbecoming that the highest court in our society
should concern itself with endeavoring to balance every conceivable expression against important interests of the society, or to make assessments of
social utility in an infinite parade of terms such as "Fuck the Draft," 446
"God-damned racketeer," 4 4 7 "White son of a bitch," 4 4 8 and "Motherfucker." 449 Comparably, the Court can conserve its time and energies by
leaving to other tribunals judgments on the "obscene" nature of hundreds of
films, magazines, and books. If it is humanly impossible for the Court to
formulate rules and doctrines applicable by lower courts, with adequate
guidance to a citizen who would be law-abiding, it must leave the task of
balancing societal interests in cases such as this with increasing frequency to
the state supreme courts and the federal courts of appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court and other tribunals continue to misconceive, in some cases, the proper methodology of a jurisprudence of interests
444. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). See note 248 supra and accompanying
text.
445. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1951) (concurring).
446. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
447. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
448. Cooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 n.1 (1972).
449. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 62
N.J. 594, 303 A.2d 889 (1972). For other cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt similarly
with obscene language, see Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) and Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
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by placing on the scales not the appropriate societal interests, but "governmental" interests and "individual" interests, there is sufficient encouragement to justify the statement that Supreme Court Justices now realize
that societal or public interests are to be balanced. Notwithstanding some
uncertainty as to the existence of societal interests in particular asserted
claims, it can be said that the Supreme Court has generally been able to
ascertain the interests our society deems worthy of being placed on the
scales in opposition to the societal interests delineated in the Constitution.
It is entirely legitimate and indeed prudent to avoid balancing societal
interests when a controversy may be resolved by other means open to the
judiciary. The variety of techniques which stop short of balancing are
numerous and capable of producing a just result. The Supreme Court has
not only agreed to the propriety of their application but has mastered well
their use.
When the Supreme Court has openly understood its obligation to weigh
and balance opposed societal interests with skill and prudence, its decisions,
as well as its language, have been generally acceptable to our society and
its system of values. Especially in the area of the first amendment interests,
the Justices have shown willingness and competence in balancing the opposed interests to the benefit and satisfaction of the society. It is desirable
to recall the words of Justice Roberts, writing the opinion for the Court in
Cantwell v. Connecticitt45 0 and balancing the interest in peace, safety, and
good order against the interest in communication:
We must determine whether the alleged protection of the State's
interest, means to which end would, in the absence of limitation
by the Federal Constitution, lie wholly within the State's discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where it has
come into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by
the federal compact. 45 1
As the bar and the bench improve their techniques of openly assessing
the societal utility of interests opposed in litigation and in forecasting accurately the effect of possible rulings upon the community, it can be anticipated that rulings of courts utilizing the methodology of a jurisprudence of
interests will be accompanied with explanations as to why one interest is to
prevail over the other in the particular circumstances, with indications of the
sources relied upon. When this methodology is utilized, constitutional rulings will be open to more rational evaluation and criticism, and greater input
into the balancing process from outside the judiciary may be exercised by
the redrafting of legislation or by constitutional amendment.
450. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
451. Id. at 307.

